Russian Politics and Law, September 2011 Table of Contents

Volume 49 Number 5 / September-October 2011 of Russian Politics and Law is now available on the M.E. Sharpe web site at

This issue contains:

Ukraine After Yushchenko: Editor’s Introduction p.3
Dmitry Gorenburg
Change, Transition, or Cycle: The Dynamics of Ukraine’s Political Regime in 2004-2010
Yuri Matsievski
Post-Soviet Gravitation: On the Results of the Presidential Elections in Ukraine p.34
Andrei Ryabov
The Language of Dystopia: The Ideological Situation in Ukraine p.43
Mikhail Minakov
Ukraine’s European Choice: What It Means for Russia p.55
Sergei Tigipko
The Ukrainian Revolution and the Russian Counterrevolution p.68
Vladimir Pastukhov
Orange Pills for Russian Diseases p.81
Igor’ Pantin

Ukraine After Yushchenko: Editor’s Introduction

Over the last decade, Ukrainian politics has been characterized by its volatility. The Orange Revolution brought hope of a rapid democratization, although these hopes were soon dashed because of divisions among the governing coalition. Finally, in 2010, a population that was tired of the political instability elected Viktor Yanukovych as president. Although there were concerns about the rollback of various rights and freedoms, Yanukovych’s promise of stability was convincing for the majority of the electorate.

This issue of Russian Politics and Law provides a range of viewpoints on Ukrainian political dynamics over the last few years. Some authors see the 2004 events as a true revolution, while others argue that it was not one because the country’s political system did not undergo any kind of fundamental transformation. The extent to which the authors see the Yanukovych presidency as potentially threatening to Ukrainian democracy also varies.

In “Change, Transition, or Cycle: The Dynamics of Ukraine’s Political Regime in 2004–10,” Yuri Matsievski sets the agenda for the issue. He argues that democratization inUkrainehas followed a zigzag course. He situates his analysis of Ukrainian politics in the international political science literature on regimes and revolutions. He describes the Ukrainian political system under Kuchma as a pyramid of informal, institutionalized rules for exercising power. Though the president was at the top of the pyramid, he had not succeeded in fully subordinating other members of the political and economic elite, allowing for a degree of political pluralism that resulted in the establishment of several competing political camps financed by various financial–industrial groups.

Matsievski then turns to the question of whether the Orange Revolution was truly a revolution or even a real change of political regime. Here, he is firmly in the camp of those scholars who argue that the events of November–December 2004 were by no means a revolution. He argues that they were not even a coup. Instead, he describes these events as a regular rotation of elites. Because the opposition elites used public protest as part of their campaign strategy, the outcome appeared to be the fall of the old regime. In reality, the positive results of the change of leadership brought about by the Orange Revolution were modest and in some respects temporary and did not amount to a change of political regime.

Under Yushchenko, the regime shifted from Kuchma’s oligarchic authoritarianism to a defective democracy that was lacking in political participation, political competition, and adherence to constitutional norms. The new leaders were unable or unwilling to rein in corruption in the political system and spent more time battling each other than conducting sorely needed political reforms. Like Kuchma’s team, Yushchenko and his colleagues focused on using their power to extract profits rather than improve governance. Matsievski argues that despite a few superficial reforms, the political system continued to be dominated by informal rules, rather than formal institutions.

At the same time, Matsievski believes that the limits on political centralization that prevented the consolidation of authoritarianism under Kuchma and hindered Yushchenko’s efforts to reform the political system will also prevent the establishment of a power vertical under the Yanukovych presidency. The same structural and procedural limitations that hindered movement toward democracy in 2005–10 will also prevent a slide toward authoritarianism from going too far.

Matsievski spells out five factors that will hinder the consolidation of authoritarianism under Yanukovych. First, the powers of the president are much reduced compared to the Kuchma period. Second, freedom of the press has been institutionalized to a much greater extent over the last five years. Third, the state has neither an effective apparatus of compulsion nor a professional bureaucracy. Fourth, societal cleavages prevent any sense of national unity from emerging. And fifth, neither the West nor Russia would benefit from having an authoritarian regime in Ukraine. As a result, while Ukraine will continue to suffer from administrative arbitrariness and corruption, it is not threatened by authoritarian consolidation.

In “Post-Soviet Gravitation: On the Results of the Presidential Elections in Ukraine,” Andrei Ryabov largely concurs with Matsievski’s assessment. He argues that despite the tone of the discussion in the press at the time, the 2010 presidential election was not actually a choice between a European and democratic path of development and the preservation of the post-Soviet model. Both leading candidates were actually representatives of the post-Soviet model who were focused on the division of resources rather than on national development. Yushchenko, in contrast, had tried to implement the political de-Sovietization and Europeanization of Ukraine, at least in the realm of foreign policy. He failed because most Ukrainians did not want to see themselves as a postcolonial nation. Furthermore, most Ukrainians had lost faith in their country’s ability to become truly European in the near term.

In this context, most voters understood that both Tymoshenko and Yanukovych had authoritarian leanings. The difference is described by one of Ryabov’s friends: “If Tymoshenko wins, things will be bad, and for a very long time. If Yanukovych wins, things will be very bad, but for a short time.” In this context, a majority of the electorate preferred a relatively weak president who will lead a government beholden to various lobbying interests to a strong populist president who might succeed in establishing an authoritarian state. In other words, Ryabov is essentially arguing that Ukrainian domestic politics under Yanukovych is likely to resemble the political situation under Kuchma.

Mikhail Minakov’s article, “The Language of Dystopia: The Ideological Situation in Ukraine,” examines Ukrainian political discourse. Minakov shows how this discourse has come to be dominated by a language that facilitates state control over a static confrontation between regionally based conservatisms, each rooted in its own historically conditioned sense of what Minakov calls ressentiment. “Ressentiment is a component of collective memory, a sort of pain of remembrance whose cause is articulated in terms of some actual, inescapably but unjustly co-present Other.” The author argues that as long as society is focused on past trauma, the state can continue to exercise control over the country. The best way out of this situation is to strengthen nonconservative political forces and social institutions that promote rationality.

The thesis that there are certain basic continuities toUkraine’s political trajectory over the last decade is reinforced in Sergei Tigipko’s article “Ukraine’s European Choice: What It Means for Russia.” Tigipko was an also-ran in the 2010 presidential election before becoming vice-premier for economic issues in the Azarov government. He argues that for Ukraine, political and economic integration with the European Union is an immutable strategic choice. At the same time, Ukraine will continue to pursue a multi­directional foreign policy that should allow Russia to see Ukraine’s leaning toward Europe as an opportunity rather than a threat. Tigipko sees Yushchenko’s foreign policy efforts as focused less on bringing Ukraine into Europe as on tearing it away from Russia. Instead, he argues for Ukraine’s potential as a bridge between Russia and Europe. To this end, he calls for a balanced foreign policy that pursues close relations with both.

Writing in a Russian publication, Tigipko argues for a close partnership between Ukraine and Russia, but one that is based on relative equality. He points out that integration that is based on a Russian takeover of key Ukrainian industries is unacceptable to Kiev. He goes on to claim that Russia needs to change its mentality, to stop treating Ukraine as a lesser country that can be ordered around by Russian leaders. He concludes by noting that Ukraine has already made its European choice and that in the end, Russia will also inevitably make the same choice.

Vladimir Pastukhov continues the theme of Ukraine’s relations with Russia but shifts the focus to domestic developments. In “The Ukrainian Revolution and the Russian Counterrevolution,” he argues that the Orange Revolution fundamentally transformed Ukrainian society. This argument is directly opposed to the first two articles in this issue. He notes that in 2010 Yanukovych is a fundamentally different politician from the one elected in 2004. Although his initial policies focused on restoring relations with Russia, the course he is now pursuing is actually focused on promoting Ukrainian national interests. To this end, Pastukhov argues that Yanukovych has gained much more than his counterparts from his initial agreements with Moscow.

In the second half of his article, Pastukhov makes the argument that Russian leaders who were haunted by the threat of a Ukrainian-style revolution implemented a series of measures that made the Russian political system dysfunctional in much the same way as the Ukrainian system was dysfunctional prior to the Orange Revolution. Just as the Ukrainian political system became rational, with conflicts being resolved openly, the Russian political system ceased to be able to react to challenges by seeking to prevent any possibility of conflict. The likely result is an increasing threat of revolution, the very thing Russian leaders were trying to avoid. The lessons Pastukhov draws from Ukrainian politics are that an unstable political system increases competition, active measures to protect against revolution are likely to cause one, and that the best way to avoid a revolution from below is to carry out a revolution from above.

In “Orange Pills for Russian Diseases,” Igor’ Pantin takes issue with Pastukhov’s analysis. He opposes Pastukhov’s description of the Orange Revolution as a revolution, pointing out that Yushchenko’s excessive focus on Ukrainian nationalism led the majority of the population to turn to Yanukovych in the 2010 election. What’s more, he thinks Pastukhov exaggerates when he thinks the Orange Revolution led Russian leaders to initiate measures to strengthen their power. Pantin also takes issue with the lessons Pastukhov draws from the Ukrainian experience. He points out that Russia already had experience with an unstable political system in the 1990s—which was not a great time for Russia. He also does not think that a revolution from above is capable of solving Russia’s political problems. For Pantin, the only solution is a political movement from below that can renew Russian governance without revolution.

The first year of Yanukovych’s presidency has shown the wisdom of Matsievski’s assessment. While there have been some efforts on the part of the government to restrict freedoms and to limit political challenges to the regime, the Ukrainian political system remains far more open and contested than that of Russia or other post-Soviet states (other than the three Baltic states and Moldova). At the same time, the ease with which Yanukovych returned to power after seemingly being completely discredited during the Orange Revolution shows that that event was a revolution in name only and did not result in fundamental political or social changes in Ukraine.


Russian Politics and Law, May 2011 Table of Contents

Andrei Ryabov

The Future of the Russian Political System: Editor’s Introduction

In this issue of Russian Politics and Law, we continue the analysis of the current state of Russia’s political system that we began in the previous issue. Whereas the previous issue analyzed the development of the system and its character, the authors in this issue focus on the system’s stability, particularly in the context of the 2008–9 global economic crisis. The crisis briefly shook the confidence of Russian political elites, and this is reflected in several of the articles printed here. The period of severe economic crisis proved to be relatively brief in Russia, however, and by early 2010 leading politicians had regained their confidence and largely ended various experiments in liberalization that had been undertaken when the economic situation was at its worst. Continue reading

Russian Politics and Law, March 2011 Table of Contents

Volume 49 Number 2 / March-April 2011 of Russian Politics and Law is now available on the web site at Contents after the cut.

This issue contains:

The Nature of the Russian Political System: Editor’s Introduction p.3
Dmitry Gorenburg
The Nature of “Putinism” p.7
Lev Gudkov
The Political Mechanics of the Russian Regime: Substitutes Versus Institutions p.34
Nikolai Petrov
Distinctive Features of Interparty Struggle in the Russian Regions: Conflict Among Influence Groups and Simulation of a Party System p.70
Alexander Kynev

The Nature of the Russian Political System: Editor’s Introduction

As we get closer to the 2012 Russian presidential elections and the prospect of the potential return of President Putin, Russian scholars have increasingly focused on thinking about the nature of Russia’s political system and speculating on how it might develop in the future. In the next two issues, we explore these questions. The articles in this issue of Russian Politics and Law investigate the main characteristics of the “Putinist” political system as it developed in Russia over the last decade. The next issue will feature articles that examine potential future trajectories of this system.

Continue reading

Russian Politics and Law, January 2011 Table of Contents

Volume 49 Number 1 / January-February 2011 of Russian Politics and Law is now available on the web site at Contents after the cut.

Continue reading

The Russian Orthodox Church and Russian Politics: Editors’ Introduction

Authors: Irina Papkova and Dmitry Gorenburg

On 5 December 2008, Aleksii II, who had been the Orthodox patriarch of Moscow and All Rus for the entire post-Soviet period, passed away. The formal enthronement of his successor, Kirill I, took place two months later.   In contrast to the secular realm, where the differences between the Putin and Medvedev presidencies are merely stylistic, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has so far experienced the tenure of the dynamic Kirill I as a veritable revolution. Furthermore, the shakeup within the ROC has already clearly affected the relationship between the Russian state and the majority national church.  Radically different from his predecessor in both the style and content of his administration of the ROC, the new patriarch has managed to move the church-state relationship in the Russian Federation in directions that were only imagined under Aleksii II.

The ROC’s post-Soviet relationship with the state has centered on several key concerns: the admissibility of religious instruction in public schools (through the framework of “Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture” courses); the introduction of chaplaincy in the armed forces; the restitution of property; and the limitation of competition by other faiths on Russian soil.   Prior to 2008, the ROC had made progress only in terms of converts; the church did not, on balance, manage to convince the state to accede to its demands.  The notorious Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations (1997), which limited proselytism in Russia, was the only success the ROC could point to; on all other counts, the state held a distinctly secular position.  With the accession of Kirill I, however, the situation began to change dramatically in favor of the church’s rising political influence.  This issue of Russian Politics and Law examines this new dynamic.  We also explore two broader problems currently debated in Russia’s overlapping social, political and ecclesiastical circles: how big a role should the Orthodox Church play in society, and to what extent should it be granted the privilege of representing that society’s interests vis à vis the state?

The first two articles–by Aleksei Makarkin and Sergei Filatov respectively–are analytical pieces that provide deep background both on the situation within the ROC since Kirill I’s enthronement and on the ways in which his patriarchate has affected church-state relations.  In “The Russian Orthodox Church: Competing Choices,” Makarkin begins by summarizing the results of the previous patriarch’s reign, concluding that Aleksii II bequeathed his successor with a consolidated institution able to play a visible role in Russian politics and society. Both Makarkin and Filatov focus on the energetic personality of the new patriarch, most visible in his support for the revitalization of the ROC’s missionary activity across the country, often in innovative form such as preaching at rock concerts. Makarkin points out that the new patriarch is a master politician, who used these abilities to defeat his main rivals for the position of Patriarch. Now that he is in charge of the ROC, he can use these abilities to tackle some of the more controversial issues facing the church, including its relationship with the Roman Catholic Church and with competing Orthodox churches in Ukraine.

Filatov, in “Socio-Religious Life in Russia in the Autumn of 2009” describes Kirill’s goal as bringing Orthodoxy “out of the ghetto” and into every possible aspect of social life.  Filatov is concerned, however, that the message of the new ROC leadership is not so much religious as nationalist in content, because the missionary rhetoric focuses mainly on “Holy Rus,” on the values of “Russian civilization,” rather than on the message of Christ. Focusing on church-state relations, Filatov describes the progress that the ROC has made since 2008 in getting the state to accede to its political preferences: the Medvedev government has granted federal approval for the teaching of “Orthodox values” in public schools; both Putin and Medvedev have moved towards authorizing full restitution of pre-Revolutionary ecclesiastical property; and the Duma has been considering further legislative restrictions on foreign proselytism. At the same time, both Makarkin and Filatov point to potential weaknesses in the ROC’s position. First, they underscore the unstable nature of the patriarch’s authority within the ROC itself, as Kirill’s authoritarian personality and somewhat liberal theological views have combined to alienate a large segment of the clergy and active laity.  Second, Filatov, in particular, points out that Russian society is by no means entirely Orthodox in its orientation, and that the persistence of a strong secularist mood among some members of the political class may potentially create friction between the state and the ROC in the future.

The rest of the articles in this issue move away from impersonal analysis and express the positions of various actors concerned with the Russian church-state relationship, including state actors, the patriarch himself, and voices from within society. Both Russian and Western experts have often underestimated the extent to which both the state and the Orthodox Church are multi-vocal, presenting the relationship as one in which a unitary church has been lobbying an increasingly responsive unitary government to further ecclesiastical interests. Yet, as mentioned above, prior to 2008 the state was more often than not unresponsive to the Church’s demands. One reason for this may be found in the actively secular orientation of some government officials. While the ROC has achieved certain goals since 2008, the path has not been simple, as the officials in question still hold influential offices and have been quite open in opposing what they view as encroaching clericalism.  In “Religion in the System of State Power,” Andrei Sebentsov (executive secretary of the Government Commission for Religious Associations) criticizes the ROC for frequently overstepping the boundaries separating church and state. Moreover, Sebentsov complains that state officials are often complicit in granting the ROC privileges that contradict Russia’s secular constitution. Complicating matters, however, even this quite vocal critic of the ROC admits that there are areas on which church and state not only can, but should work together, such as strengthening the position of Russia abroad.

In fact, the past two years have seen an increasing coordination in the policies of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ROC’s outreach to its parishes outside Russian borders. In his “Address at the Grand Opening of the Third Assembly of the Russian World,” Patriarch Kirill stresses the important role played by the church in ensuring at least a spiritual unity between Orthodox Christians of Slavic background, reminding Ukrainians, Belarussians and Russians of their common heritage.  In the context of the competition between the West and Russia for hegemony over large areas of the former Russian/Soviet Empire, the patriarch’s language in this article is striking for its ethno-linguistic, cultural understanding of the proposed “Russian world,” and for the decidedly underemphasized role he accords to Orthodoxy. In his trenchant critique of the patriarch’s address (“Geopolitics from the Patriarch: The Heavenly Kingdom Versus the ‘Russian World’”), Gennadii Druzenko writes that “the most remarkable thing about this speech is that the head of the largest national Orthodox Church spoke for twenty-five minutes and mentioned God only three times…while repeating thirty-eight times the phrase ‘Russian world’ – a term [that] sounds like a geopolitical concept bearing little connection to church doctrine.”

The impression that Patriarch Kirill understands the interests of church and state to be inseparable is strengthened in his “Address at the Opening of the Eighteenth International Christmas Readings.”  The purpose of the Christmas Readings has been to heighten the visibility of the ROC’s role in education; over the years, the event has evolved into the ROC’s largest annual gathering, involving clergy, laity and political actors.   In his address to the participants, Kirill I underscores the importance of the Orthodox Church in ensuring a patriotic education infused with reverential memory for Russia’s past glories. Though he refers in passing to individual salvation, the emphasis here is clearly on the role that the ROC can play in strengthening the post-Soviet Russian state.  Here, Patriarch Kirill functions almost explicitly as a political, rather than religious, authority figure.

In his address to the Christmas Readings, Patriarch Kirill harkens back to the assumption that, in lobbying for the introduction of an Orthodox component into public school education, the ROC speaks for Russian society.  At the same time, the “Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture” project had, prior to 2008, floundered in part because the society supposedly interested in it in fact offered up a surprising resistance to its realization.  Despite President Dmitry Medvedev’s recent authorization of federal support for the “Orthodox Culture” course, opposition within certain segments of Russian society remains strong. In “Orthodox Bolshevism,” Mikhail Sitnikov warns that the legalization of the course across the Russian Federation may lead to a new totalitarianism where politicized Orthodoxy replaces Communism as the compulsory state ideology.  Sitnikov’s article is polemical and does not claim to represent the voice of the Russian population in general.  In “They Did not Take it On Faith” Irina Ivoilova and Sergei Kuskin simply bring forward statistics showing that, given the option of choosing courses on religion and on secular ethics for their children, the majority of Russian parents have, as of 2010, voted in favor of the secular option.

The articles in this issue show that the ROC is increasingly becoming an effective force in Russian political life, despite the low levels of religiosity among nominal church adherents. Patriarch Kirill has already used his political skills to achieve the introduction of courses on Orthodoxy in Russian schools and the establishment of a chaplain system in the Russian military, policy achievements that eluded his predecessor despite years of sustained lobbying. The ROCs is likely to continue to use his skills to advance its political agenda for the foreseeable future.

Russian Politics and Law, November 2010 Table of Contents

Volume 48 Number 6 / November-December 2010 of Russian Politics and Law is now available on the web site at Contents after the cut.

This issue contains:

Russia in the Western World: Russian Interactions with Europe: Editor’s Introduction p.3
Dmitry Gorenburg
Russians’ Views on Foreign Policy After the Caucasus Crisis p.7
Andrei Andreev
The Anti-Russian Discourse of the European Union: Causes and Main Targets p.19
Pavel Tsygankov and Filipp Fominykh
Perceptions of Russia in the European North: Signs of the Times p.35
Konstantin Voronov
An Answer to the “Polish Question” p.51
Iurii Solozobov
Alienation as a Resource in Ukraine’s Relations with Russia p.64
Aleksandr Slin’ko
The Power of Mutual Repulsion: Russia and Ukraine—Two Versions of One Transformation p.70
Vladimir Pastukhov

Russia in the Western World: Russian Interactions with Europe

Since at least August 2008, Russian foreign policy toward the West has come to be seen by many analysts as aggressive and bent on extracting maximum economic and political benefit regardless of the long term consequences for relationships. In this issue, six Russian scholars discuss their perceptions of Russian attitudes toward and relations with its neighbors to the West.

The first three articles in this issue focus on how Russians and Europeans view each other. The issue opens with Andrei Andreev’s article on “Russians’ Views on Foreign Policy After the Caucasus Crisis.” In this article, the author argues on the basis of survey data that the Russian–Georgian war of August 2008 greatly accelerated a gradual shift already underway in Russian public opinion, creating a consensus opposed to the West and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He discusses the rapid increase in negative public perceptions of the United States in the aftermath of the war and similar changes in attitude toward other countries that openly supported the Georgian side, include Great Britain and Ukraine. Negative feelings toward international organizations are pronounced only in the case of NATO. Other such organizations are viewed quite positively by most Russians.

Although Andreev recognizes that attitudes are fluid, he nevertheless characterizes the post-war situation as indicative of a qualitatively new stage in Russian foreign policy – one that is more oriented toward shows of strength and the achievement of results regardless of how Russian actions are viewed internationally. However, this finding has not stood the test of time. Russian attitudes toward the US and other Western countries have gradually returned to their pre-war average values, while Russian leaders have recently shown signs of willingness to compromise in their foreign policy decision-making.

In “The Anti-Russian Discourse of the European Union: Causes and Main Targets,” Pavel Tsygankov and Filipp Fominykh analyze the content of anti-Russian rhetoric in the European Union (EU) as it pertains to Russian economic strategy, domestic policy, and foreign policy. They explain its causes mainly in terms of divergent economic interests and the EU’s internal needs for identity and consolidation. They separate the traditional West European powers from the new East European EU members, arguing that the latter are driven in their anti-Russian views by an inferiority complex toward the rest of Europe that paradoxically leads them to actions that violate European norms.

The authors also note some aspects of Russian policy and internal development that lead to anti-Russian attitudes in Europe. They argue that Russian economic growth and the strengthening of Russian internal political and economic control over its own territory as factors that infringe on the political and economic interests of European elites. But in the end, they return to internal European factors as the key to explaining European attitudes, arguing that Europe needs a “significant other” in order to maintain its drive toward greater internal unity. Russia, in their argument, is the best candidate for filling this niche.

Whereas the first two articles examine relations between Russia and Europe as a whole, the other articles in this issue focus on specific subregions or countries. Konstanin Voronov, in “Perceptions of Russia in the European North: Signs of the Times,” examines the images and perceptions of Russia prevailing in Scandinavia and the Baltic states and the historical and contemporary factors that have shaped them. He contrasts good-neighborly attitudes in Finland and Scandinavia with hostility to Russia in the Baltic states. He argues that most of the population of this region is disenchanted with Russia’s behavior in both its internal affairs and its foreign policy and continues to view Russia as simply the continuation of the Soviet Union in the present day. At the same time, he believes that if the political elites of these countries decided they would benefit from a change in attitudes, they could begin a campaign of “reeducation” of the masses that, as the Finnish example has shown, could work in the long run.

The author comes to the conclusion, however, that the image of Russia among the Scandinavian population does not really matter for bilateral relations or policy making in the region. Despite negative attitudes among their populations, the Scandinavian governments have friendly and pragmatic relations with Russia. However, this is not the case for the Baltic states, which continue to blame Russia for the occupation of their countries by the Soviet Union.

The last three articles, address relations between Russia and the two European neighbors with which bilateral relations were most hostile for the second half of the last decade. In “An Answer to the ‘Polish Question,’” Iurii Solozobov assesses the improvement in Russian–Polish relations since the Tusk government took office in Poland. He notes that Tusk has carried out a far more pragmatic foreign policy than his predecessor, which has led to a decline in tension in the relationship. The article was written before the air crash in Smolensk that killed the Polish president and a significant number of other members of the Polish political elite. Russian actions in the aftermath of this disaster have led to further improvements in Polish-Russian relations.

Solozobov also argues that Russia should aim to Finlandize neighboring states, in the sense of developing mutually advantageous pragmatic cooperative relations that avoid demeaning lectures about questions of democracy and human rights. He calls for a policy of compromises without one-sided concessions and dialogue without giving up any sovereignty. As a result of such a policy, he believes that the two sides will develop an understanding of the strategic and normative value of a positive relationship between Russia and Poland.

In “Alienation as a Resource in Ukraine’s Relations with Russia,” written while Viktor Yushchenko was still President of Ukraine, Aleksandr Slinko surveys the range of attitudes toward Russia among Ukrainian specialists. He divides them into four groups: nationalists, conspiracy theorists, critics of the Orange revolution, and rationalists. He argues that the latter group, which believes that good relations are the dominant tendency in Russian-Ukrainian relations, is now dominant and the period of anti-Russian populism in Ukraine has passed its peak. Given the trajectory in bilateral relations since the election of Viktor Yanukovich, he may well be right.

In “The Power of Mutual Repulsion: Russia and Ukraine—Two Versions of One Transformation,” the last article in this issue, the philosopher Vladimir Pastukhov reflects on Russian–Ukrainian relations, emphasizing their subjective or psychological aspect. He argues that proximity is not conducive to cooperation but instead generates mutual repulsion. Respectful—albeit not friendly—cooperation, however, would be a rational response to certain threats faced by both Russia and Ukraine.

He argues that the two countries are currently united by their positions in the world, where they are surrounded by more economically and culturally powerful states. At the core, they both face crises of spiritual values that need to be resolved before they can modernize their political or economic systems. The threat posed by these crises will force both countries to accelerate the tempo of their internal development or become essentially colonies of more powerful neighbors. Cooperation will increase the chances of success for both, while continued competition will come to resemble a fight between two paupers. Of course, this competition cannot be arrived at immediately, but given the recent tenor of bilateral relations, will need to be developed gradually.

The six articles in this issue show that Russian political scientists recognize that the conflictual nature of relations between Russia and its neighbors is harmful for Russia’s long term political development. Recent signs of a more pragmatic and cooperative tone in Russian foreign policy pronouncements shows that its rulers may be coming to recognize this as well.