An Emerging Strategic Partnership: Trends in Russia-China Military Cooperation

One more policy brief from the series on Russian strategic culture and leadership decision-making, written for a collaborative project organized by the Marshall Center with support from the Russia Strategy Initiative. This one is on Russia-China military cooperation.  Several sections of this brief are based on previous work on Russia-China cooperation that was co-authored with Michael Kofman, Paul Schwartz, and Katherine Baughman.

As with the previous ones, I am posting the full text here with permission from the Marshall Center. Please go to the newly updated Marshall Center website if you would prefer to read a PDF version.

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Executive Summary

• Since 2014, Russia and China have developed a strategic partnership, primarily due to enhanced military cooperation, including sales of advanced military equipment and an increasingly robust program of bilateral and multi-lateral military exercises. Economic and diplomatic cooperation have also increased, though to a much lesser extent.
• Bilateral cooperation is unlikely to advance to the level of a full alliance because of differences in geopolitical interests and asymmetries of power, with Russia remaining reluctant to fully acknowledge China’s geopolitical rise.
• Actions by the United States to pressure both Russia and China have the effect of pushing the two countries closer together. To prevent a closer partnership, the United States should focus on creating areas of policy divergence between the two states.

Introduction

There is widespread consensus among scholars that, although Russia and China have been moving toward closer cooperation through the entire post-Soviet era, the trend has accelerated rapidly since 2014.¹ The relationship was boosted by Russian leaders’ belief that Russia could survive its sudden confrontation with the West only by finding an alternative external partner. China was the obvious candidate because it had a suitably large economy, was not openly hostile to Russia, and was not planning to impose sanctions in response to the Ukraine crisis.

Since 2014, the bilateral relationship has been focused on increased military cooperation, closer economic ties, and an increase in coordination on responses to various issues in international politics. Although some advances have occurred in all three areas, military cooperation has advanced the most. As discussed in more detail later in this paper, Russia and China have institutionalized a comprehensive mechanism for military consultation, expanded military technical cooperation initiatives and military personnel exchanges, and expanded regular joint military exercises. In the diplomatic sphere, Russia and China have supported each other in various international organizations and worked to establish new international institutions that could act as alternatives to existing Western-dominated institutions.²

Although economic cooperation is the weakest aspect of the Russia-China alignment, it has progressed a great deal, particularly in the energy field. “China is eager to increase energy relations with Russian companies,… [while] Russian concern over its increased dependence on China in the East is deemed secondary to expanding Russia’s customer base beyond the still dominant European market.”³ At the same time, there have been limits to this cooperation, particularly in the economic and financial sectors outside of the energy sphere. China refused to help Russia overcome the effects of Western economic sanctions and bilateral trade and trade in national currencies has remained limited, with little diversification of trade and investments. On the political side, neither country has shown itself to be prepared to support the other’s geopolitical interests if doing so would hurt its own interests.⁴

This policy brief focuses primarily on strategic and military cooperation, where the two sides have made the greatest progress. After briefly discussing the prospects for a strategic partnership between Russia and China, I examine the progress in and remaining constraints on expanding bilateral military cooperation, outline three scenarios for future cooperation in this sphere, and conclude with a discussion of how the United States should respond.

Strategic Partnership?

As bilateral cooperation has progressed, analysts have increasingly examined whether the Russia-China relationship has reached a level of strategic partnership. The growing consensus is that it has.⁵ According to Alexander Korolev, the partnership is neither ad hoc nor temporary and provides clear benefits for both sides: “Through this partnership, Russia can gain access to more instruments for promoting its agenda of balancing the United States and enhancing its version of multi-polarity in Europe. China, in turn, receives Russia’s political backing and access to Russia’s energy resources and military technologies, which are essential assets for China in its growing tensions with the U.S. in Asia.”⁶  Some Russian scholars are even more optimistic about the trajectory of the relationship, suggesting that, over time, the two states might even develop an alliance.⁷

At the same time, there is a similar consensus forming that the current upward trend in Russia-China strategic cooperation should not be viewed as irreversible. In particular, scholars note that, should Russia’s challenge to the United States start to destabilize the international system, it may also jeopardize China’s peaceful rise. This would lead to a divergence in the countries’ interests and potentially cause a rift between the two powers to emerge.⁸ Some scholars argue that the geopolitical and economic factors that have hindered Russia’s past Asian pivots could have a similar effect again, although this is distinctly a minority position. One possibility proposed by analysts who hold this view is that a future leadership transition in Russia might result in a policy shift back toward a preference for closer relations with Europe, undermining the long-term prospects of Russia’s partnership with China.⁹

Central Asia represents one potential area of tension between Russia and China, because the two states have formulated competing regional influence projects for the region. As a result, some analysts believe that the two countries may be heading toward a strategic rivalry caused by China’s increasing desire to play a role in Central Asian security and by competition over energy export routes and trade connectivity in general.¹⁰ A more likely scenario, however, is that the two countries will maintain a division of responsibilities that allows them to continue to cooperate in the region, with Russia taking primary responsibility for security issues while China focuses on economic development.¹¹

The global coronavirus pandemic initially introduced another source of tension into the Russia-China relationship, especially since Russia moved quickly in late January to close its borders with China. This move was seen by some observers as an indicator of a lack of trust in Chinese information, since China at the time was still making an effort to minimize the scope and threat of the epidemic. At the same time, the almost immediate decision to reopen the border to commercial traffic highlighted Russia’s dependence on Chinese goods.¹² As it turned out, even this partial closure proved to be economically damaging, especially in the Russian Far East.¹³ However, any residual tension was overcome once China largely ended community spread of the virus. Once the threat of spread was over, the two countries developed complementary information campaigns designed to highlight their mutual assistance in the crisis and the superiority of authoritarian systems over democratic ones in marshalling resources to fight the pandemic.¹⁴

Future of Bilateral Military Cooperation

Russian senior officials have highlighted the special nature of Russia’s defense relationship with China by characterizing the ties in terms of a strategic partnership. As the two countries have expanded the number of military exercises and consultations while deepening military technical cooperation, analysts have suggested a growing alignment between the two countries at a political level that allows for stronger defense ties. This does not mean that Russia and China are about to enter a military alliance. As cogently argued by Michael Kofman, Russian and Chinese leaders have labeled the relationship a strategic alliance because a military alliance is not needed, given that the two countries do not need each other for security guarantees or extended nuclear deterrence. That said, they have sought to make their ties more formal, as shown by the 2017 agreement on a three-year road map to establish a legal framework to govern military cooperation. This framework is expected to be completed and signed later in 2020, further codifying various aspects of defense ties, including the option of conducting joint long-range aviation patrols.¹⁵

Military Technical Cooperation

Although China was Russia’s leading client for military hardware in the 1990s and early 2000s, the arms sales relationship sharply declined after 2006 because of a combination of Chinese unhappiness with Russian pricing policies and the poor maintenance record of Russian equipment, as well as Russian concerns about China’s tendency to reverse-engineer Russian equipment for both its own use and export abroad. Russian arms sales to China saw a modest revival post-2011 but expanded most substantially after the Ukraine crisis, with agreements for the sale of S-400 air defense systems and Su-35 combat aircraft signaling the end of Russia’s informal ban on sales of advanced weapon systems to China.¹⁶ In October 2019, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was helping China develop its own ballistic missile early warning system. Russia’s new willingness to share information related to strategic nuclear weapons highlights the extent to which old sensitivities about sharing advanced military technology with China has dissipated in recent years.¹⁷ Russia has also turned to China for electronic components and naval diesel engines that it could no longer obtain from the West. Most significantly, military cooperation and defense ties improved as defense sales declined, making clear that such ties are driven at the senior political level and not tied to arms sales.

However, Russia faces a difficult choice this decade in either providing advanced technology to China, knowing that the technology will most likely be copied, or forgoing arms sales but with the expectation that China’s defense sector will develop comparable systems in the near future. The previous Russian arms export strategy of selling the “second-best” technology available while staying a generation ahead is no longer viable. China’s defense industry has sufficiently caught up with or worked around Russia via defense-cooperation deals with other countries that it is now only interested in the most-advanced Russian weapons available. China’s advances in weapon design and general goal of self-sufficiency in military production suggest that Russian arms sales will never reach the peak achieved in the early 2000s and that China will emerge as a stronger arms market competitor to Russia over time.

Military Exercises

Military exercises are a central pillar of bilateral military relations. Moscow and Beijing have recently been rapidly expanding the scale and pace of their joint exercise activity far beyond the two traditional programs, the Peace Mission ground forces exercises in Central Asia and the Joint Sea naval exercises. Both of the long-standing exercise programs have had an anti-U.S. character, with gradually increasing levels of complexity and joint activity. However, the exercises have been criticized for being overly scripted and poorly coordinated, as well as for continuing to lack a joint command structure.¹⁸ These criticisms are not necessarily warranted, as the purposes of the exercises are primarily to build military ties at the senior level and to signal political intentions rather than to establish interoperability. There has been no evidence that Russia and China intend to operate in a joint command structure; such a structure would not make sense for two countries that have not entered a formal military alliance.

The naval exercises between Russia and China have been more effective in terms of providing realistic operational experience, although they have not focused particularly on interoperability between the two navies. Naval exercises are not only becoming more frequent but also are being held in new geographical areas. Before the Ukraine crisis, Russia refused to hold bilateral exercises in such controversial territories as southern China near Taiwan. Since 2015, however, naval exercises have been held in areas such as the Baltic and South China Seas as a way of signaling the two countries’ growing power, expanding military ties, and mutual displeasure with the United States.¹⁹ Recent trilateral exercises with Iran represent another example of this steady expansion in the use of exercises for political signaling, now including third nations.²⁰ Given China’s desire to be more visible in the European maritime theater, one can expect an increase in exercises that serve the Chinese desire to show its flag in distant waters.

Since 2015, the two countries have expanded their repertoire of exercises, including adding joint missile defense exercises in response to the U.S. deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. Most observers are aware of growing Chinese participation in Russian strategic exercises, including Vostok-2018 and Tsentr-2019. A joint Russian-Chinese bomber patrol in July 2019 demonstrated that Moscow is increasingly willing to disregard the interests of other states in the Asia-Pacific region in its pursuit of a closer military relationship with China.²¹

These exercises are primarily focused on setting a positive tone for military-to-military ties at the highest levels, rather than increasing interoperability at the tactical level. The exercises suggest that Russian-Chinese military cooperation in the air domain, which lags naval exercises, will increase. Stronger participation of Chinese air assets in Tsentr-2019 further substantiates this observed trend.²² Space is the next likely frontier for expanding cooperation, although it may be limited given sensitivities about the technologies involved in this domain.

Limitations on Bilateral Military Cooperation

Despite steady progress over the past decade, there remain significant geopolitical and technical constraints on military cooperation between Russia and China. Although senior Chinese and Russian officials repeatedly and publicly affirm that their relationship is characterized by great trust, in reality, a lack of mutual trust remains an obstacle to more robust cooperation. Although Russia and China formally settled the last of their border disputes in 2008, there are still regions where the two sides’ geopolitical interests may not align in the long term. Russia remains concerned over potential Chinese encroachment into the Russian Far East. Russia’s concerns are fueled by a combination of past Chinese claims to territory Russia annexed in the 1800s and the contrast between the sparsely populated Russian Far East and the densely populated Chinese border regions, which have generated ongoing Chinese immigration. A military incursion is seen as unlikely by Moscow relative to the more insidious problem of what Russian leaders fear could prove to be (1) a creeping annexation, in which China projects influence into parts of the Russian Far East on a de facto basis through a large influx of illegal Chinese immigrants, and (2) a steady reorientation of the Russian Far East toward more economically attractive Chinese markets and away from the distant center of power in Moscow.

As the relative balance of influence in Central Asia continues to shift more in favor of China, the potential for the two sides to clash over interests in the region remains significant. Beijing has steadily supplanted Russia as the principal economic power in Central Asia in terms of investment and lending. Still, countries in the region continue to look primarily to Russia to defend their security interests; additionally, Russia remains the principal labor market for this region.

Thus far, this de facto division of labor has enabled Russia and China to maintain a reasonably stable working relationship in Central Asia, such that they do not step on each other’s vital national interests or security concerns. However, as China’s Belt and Road Initiative develops, its economic footprint in Central Asia is likely to grow larger, which could lead to tensions between Beijing and Moscow.

Russia has sought to play a key role in the development of the Arctic region; in particular, it plans to capitalize on new energy sources, as well as the opening of the Northern Sea Route. While Moscow has been willing to work with other members of the Arctic Council, Russia has been reluctant to allow non-Arctic powers, such as China, to play a major role in the region. By contrast, a resource-hungry China has plans to extend its presence to the Arctic and is building its first domestically-produced icebreaker. Although none of these geopolitical concerns are currently likely to cause tensions that could limit military cooperation between Russia and China, they could be factors in the long term.

The asymmetry in economic power between the two countries, including their potential regional influence and global heft, has grown more visible. Furthermore, Russian strategic culture, long having seen itself as superior to China, is visibly struggling with the new realities of this power balance. As a result, Russian political elites have yet to come to terms with China’s rise. Finally, both countries are deeply nationalistic and prestige-seeking, which means neither would be particularly willing to subordinate its military to the leadership of the other. Russian leaders’ desire to maintain an independent foreign policy means that they will not accept Chinese leadership or impose limitations on their relationships with other countries for the sake of Chinese foreign policy. Although the two countries seek to manage conflict over core interests, most international competition is seen as fair game, whether it is arms sales or foreign direct investment.

Russia and China have placed a low priority on achieving greater interoperability during joint military exercises, reflecting an enduring lack of interest on the part of both sides in developing the kind of integrated military capability needed to conduct effective joint military operations.²³ At the tactical level, issues such as language and communication highlight that these are decidedly different military structures, with different planning processes and organizational cultures. This limits what the Chinese are able to learn from their counterparts.

China is seen as a predatory power by many Russian experts, so there is a natural degree of apprehension among the Russian military. General Staffs plan contingencies around capabilities, because intent can change. This is especially so when dealing with another great power that is self-admittedly revisionist in its ambitions. Despite the positive outlook of Russia’s national leadership on the benefits of a growing Sino-Russian alignment, the military establishment will always see the Chinese military as a potential adversary and plan accordingly.

Scenarios for Future Russia-China Military Cooperation

The impact of various scenarios for the development of Russia-China military cooperation on U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region is inversely correlated with their likelihood. That is, the most likely scenarios are relatively low impact, while the highest-impact scenarios are very unlikely to develop. In this section, I outline three scenarios for future military cooperation between Russia and China.

Low Impact, High Probability

In a low-impact, high-probability scenario, Russia and China expand their military cooperation by holding additional joint naval exercises with countries that are seen as adversarial to the United States and expanding the visibility of their maritime presence both in the Pacific and the Mediterranean regions. As noted earlier, previous joint naval exercises have been conducted in the South China Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Baltic Sea, and future theaters could include other areas within the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. Expanded exercises in these regions would serve the two countries’ respective purposes, as Russia seeks greater visibility in the Asia-Pacific and China seeks greater visibility in the European maritime theater.

Both countries seek to reciprocate U.S. freedom-of-navigation operations to the extent possible by visiting the Western Hemisphere. Russia and China could agree to hold a naval exercise in the Caribbean Sea, hosted by Venezuela or Cuba. Such an exercise would have little long-term impact on either Russia’s or China’s geopolitical influence in Latin America and it would not do much to improve their military capabilities or naval interoperability. It would, however, generate a great deal of media attention, highlighting the countries’ ostensible global reach and potential strategic partnership. In other words, both countries could feel that they had scored a propaganda win at relatively low cost, but the actual impact on regional security would be negligible.

Medium Impact, Medium Probability

A medium-impact, medium-probability scenario might focus on additional sales of Russian advanced military equipment. The most interesting systems for China would include diesel-electric submarines, over-the-horizon radar systems, early warning systems, space-related technology for satellites, microchips, and next-generation aircraft engines. In return, Russia might accelerate the purchase of Chinese defense-industrial components, such as heavy-lift cranes, machine tools, and circuitry board components and parts. Although Russia would benefit substantially from procuring Chinese surface combatant vessels, given the shortcomings in those parts of the Russian defense-industrial complex, the financial interests of Russia’s domestic defense industry would likely prevent such deals from being made.

The two countries could also build on Russia’s recent sale to China of S-400 long-range air defense systems to agree to the sale of Russian S-500 air defense systems once those come online. S-500 systems would have a longer range than existing systems owned by China and may have the capability of defending against a wider range of missile types. These capabilities would lead to a significant improvement in Chinese air defense capabilities versus the United States and its allies. China would seek to acquire the 40N6 extended-range (400-km) missile, which has reached initial operating capability with the S-400, either as part of an S-500 deal or on its own for China’s existing S-400 systems.

High Impact, Low Probability

A number of highly unlikely but potentially very damaging scenarios present themselves. One such area would involve greater Russian-Chinese defense industrial cooperation on sensitive technology, such as theater hypersonic weapons or submarine quieting. Although military establishments on both sides would almost certainly resist allowing the other side access to such technology, if such cooperation did develop, it would substantially affect the ability of the United States to maintain a favorable regional military balance and retain a technological edge in certain domains over China. One possibility for enhanced defense cooperation that has been discussed in recent years, though with little progress to date, is a potential technology transfer deal in which Moscow would provide Beijing with the RD-180 rocket engine in exchange for space-grade microelectronic components.²⁴ Past discussion centered on trading finished equipment, but a  closer relationship between Russia and China may result in consideration of exchanging production technology in the future. Such a deal would increase China’s lift capacity and Russia’s ability to produce advanced guidance and control systems.

Another scenario in this category is a joint military intervention, most likely in a Central Asian country in the event of a political crisis or instability, because Russia and China have previously conducted exercises to deconflict areas of responsibility in this type of scenario. However, one should not exclude the possibility of a joint Russian-Chinese intervention in Africa or the Middle East. While the countries lack core interests in these regions, the cost and risk of intervention is also dramatically lower and the barrier for entry in such operations is not especially high. Both countries have the expeditionary capacity to conduct relatively small force deployments around much of the world and might well seek to do so together in response to a contingency where their interests align.

The least likely, but nonetheless possible, scenario is a military crisis with the United States in which one country takes advantage of a situation to press for geopolitical gains. For example, in the event of a standoff between the United States and China, Russia would seek to leverage the distraction of the United States to make opportunistic gains. Russia could deploy forces to Asia or provide military assistance via deniable means to China in order to raise costs to the United States. Because China is quite remote from Europe, the likelihood of Chinese involvement in a crisis between Russia and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe is too low to be worth considering.

How Should the United States Respond?

There is a general perception among experts that greater cooperation between Russia and China is inevitable, given the core precepts of present-day U.S. foreign policy. Scholars focused on relative power suggest that the two countries will inevitably balance against the most powerful country in the international system.²⁵ Furthermore, U.S. efforts to pursue a hard line against either Russia or China, and especially against both at the same time, have the effect of driving the two countries closer together. For some scholars, this suggests that accommodating them within the existing international order would be a more effective response.²⁶ Scholars focused on the role played by ideas highlight the perceived threat of liberal ideology and suggest that if the United States reduces its emphasis on democracy promotion and regime change, this would reduce the impetus to Russian-Chinese cooperation.²⁷

In this geopolitical environment, actions by the United States that threaten Russia and China in a similar manner or present a common security challenge will have the effect of driving the two countries closer together. This is especially true if the actions are strategic in nature. Examples of such actions include the deployment of missile defense systems or freedom-of-navigation operations near the shores of either Russia or China. Both of these actions create a perception among Russian and Chinese leaders that they share a common global security challenge from the United States—and one that is serious enough that they would be best served by facing it together.

On the other hand, actions that disaggregate the nature of the threat perceived by Russian and Chinese leaders would help create divergence in their interests and thereby slow the trend toward a closer bilateral relationship. For example, the United States could challenge Russia in ways that are exclusive to the European theater, such as by pulsing additional troops to NATO member states for exercises. Similarly, China could be challenged in the regions of Taiwan and Southeast Asia rather than in East Asia or maritime territories adjacent to Russian territory. Russian relations with such countries as Vietnam and India could be exploited to highlight potential tensions between Russia and China.

Notes

¹ Alexander Gabuev, Friends with Benefits? Russian-Chinese Relations After the Ukraine Crisis, Carnegie Moscow Center, June 29 2016, https://carnegie.ru/2016/06/29/friends-with-benefits-russian-chinese-relations-after-ukraine-crisis-pub-63953.

²  Alexander Korolev, “How Closely Aligned Are China and Russia? Measuring Strategic Cooperation in IR,” International Politics, May 2019.

³ Tom Røseth, “Russia’s Energy Relations with China: Passing the Strategic Threshold?” Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2017, pp. 23–55.

⁴ Mikhail Korostikov, Дружба на расстоянии руки: Как Москва и Пекин определили границы допустимого [“Friendship at Arms’ Length: How Moscow and Beijing Determined the Boundaries of the Permissible”], Kommersant, May 31, 2019, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3984186.

⁵ Tom Røseth, “Moscow’s Response to a Rising China: Russia’s Partnership Policies in Its Military Relations with Beijing,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 66, No. 4, 2019, pp. 268–286.

⁶ Korolev, 2019, p. 29.

⁷ Vassily Kashin, “Is the Conflict Inevitable? Not at All. How Reasonable Are Western Expectations of a Russia-China Confrontation?” Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2017

⁸ Andrej Krickovic, “The Symbiotic China-Russia Partnership: Cautious Riser and Desperate Challenger,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2017, pp. 299–329.

⁹ Chris Miller, “Will Russia’s Pivot to Asia Last?” Orbis, Winter 2020. See also Mikhail Karpov, “The Grandeur and Miseries of Russia’s ‘Turn to the East’: Russian-Chinese ‘Strategic Partnership’ in the Wake of the Ukraine Crisis and Western Sanctions,” Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2018.

¹⁰ Carla P. Freeman, “New Strategies for an Old Rivalry? China–Russia Relations in Central Asia After the Energy Boom,” Pacific Review, Vol. 31, No. 5, 2018, pp. 635–654.

¹¹ Liselotte Odgaard, “Beijing’s Quest for Stability in Its Neighborhood: China’s Relations with Russia in Central Asia,” Asian Security, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2017, pp. 41–58.

¹² Jake Rudnitsky and Evgenia Pismennaya, “Russia Closes Border With China to People, Not Goods,” Bloomberg News, January 30, 2020,  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-30/russia-closing-border-with-china-to-affect-people-not-goods.

¹³ Andrew Higgins, “Businesses Getting Killed on Russian Border as Coronavirus Fears Rise,” New York Times, February 24, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/24/world/europe/coronavirus-russia-china-commerce.html.

¹⁴ Van Ivej, “Выход из Кризиса и Преимущества Китая, [Exit from Crisis and China’s Advantages],” Russia in Global Affairs, April 1, 2020, https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/vyhod-iz-krizisa-i-preimushhestva-kitaya/; Fyodor Lukyanov, “Вирус Разнообразия [Virus of Diversity],” Russia in Global Affairs, March 25, 2020, https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/virus-raznoobraziya/.

¹⁵ Michael Kofman, “Towards a Sino-Russian Entente?” Riddle, November 29, 2019, https://www.ridl.io/en/towards-a-sino-russian-entente.

¹⁶ Siemon Wezeman, “China, Russia and the Shifting Landscape of Arms Sales,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, July 5, 2017, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2017/china-russia-and-shifting-landscape-arms-sales.

¹⁷ Dmitry Stefanovich, “Russia to Help China Develop an Early Warning System,” The Diplomat, October 25, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/russia-to-help-china-develop-an-early-warning-system.

¹⁸ Daniel Urchik, “What We Learned from Peace Mission 2018,” Small Wars Journalundated, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-we-learned-peace-mission-2018.

¹⁹ Chris Buckley, “Russia to Join China in Naval Exercise in Disputed South China Sea,” New York Times, July 29, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/world/asia/russia-china-south-china-sea-naval-exercise.html and Andrew Higgins, “China and Russia Hold First Joint Naval Drill in the Baltic Sea,” New York Times, July 25, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/world/europe/china-russia-baltic-navy-exercises.html.

²⁰ Andrew Osborn, “Russia, China, Iran Start Joint Naval Drills in Indian Ocean,” Reuters, December 27, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-military-russia-china/russia-china-iran-start-joint-naval-drills-in-indian-ocean-idUSKBN1YV0IB.

²¹ Franz-Stefan Gady, “The Significance of the First Ever China-Russia Strategic Bomber Patrol,” The Diplomat, July 25, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/the-significance-of-the-first-ever-china-russia-strategic-bomber-patrol/.

²² “China to Send 1,600 Troops, About 30 Aircraft to Russia’s Strategic Military Drills,” TASS, August 29, 2019, https://tass.com/defense/1075535.

²³ Paul Schwartz, “The Military Dimension in Sino-Russian Relations,” in Jo Inge Bekkevold and Bobo Lo, eds. Sino-Russian Relations in the 21st Century, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), p. 105.

²⁴ Eric Berger, “Russia Now Looking to Sell Its Prized Rocket Engines to China,” Ars Technica, January 18, 2018, https://arstechnica.com/science/2018/01/russia-now-looking-to-sell-its-prized-rocket-engines-to-china.

²⁵ Robert S. Ross, “Sino‑Russian Relations: The False Promise of Russian Balancing,” International Politics, September 2019.

²⁶ Krickovic, 2017.

²⁷ John M. Owen IV, “Sino‑Russian Cooperation Against Liberal Hegemony,” International Politics, January 2020.

US-Russian arms competition will focus on India

I’ve fallen behind on reprinting my Oxford Analytica briefs. Here’s one from late January, on US-Russian competition in arms sales. This version is slightly different from the originally published version, in that I have restored some material cut due to space constraints.

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SIGNIFICANCE: India is the world’s largest arms importer and its primary suppliers are Russia and the United States. Although the two suppliers largely sell their weapons to different customers globally, Russian efforts to expand to new markets to compensate for declining sales to traditional partners will lead to increased competition with the United States in many parts of the world.

ANALYSIS: Impacts

• The most likely new markets for Russian arms sales include South America, South-east Asia, Egypt and Pakistan.
• Russian competition with the United States in arms sales will be limited to a small number of countries.
• Defence firms offering technology transfers will have an edge in the Indian market.
• For decades, Russia and the United States have been the largest arms exporters in the world. From 2009 to 2013, Russia accounted for 27% of total world arms sales, while the United States was just ahead with 29%.
• Russian arms sales have been highly dependent on a few major customers, with India, China and Algeria accounting for over 60% of Russian purchases in the last five years.
• US arms sales are far more diversified, with the top three customers (Australia, South Korea and the United Arab Emirates) accounting for under 30% of total sales.

Shifting markets for Russia

The main targets of Russian weapon sales have been shifting:

China

Sales to China have declined as Beijing pursues a programme of domestic manufacturing of advanced weaponry. Many Chinese designs appear to be based on reverse-engineered Russian imports, particularly in fighter aircraft.

Europe and the Middle East

Russia has already lost other markets in Europe where many former Warsaw Pact countries are shifting to NATO equipment. Conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa have halted major sales to Libya and Syria.

India

Russian military industry is also worried about potential declines in purchases by India, its leading customer. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has reported that between 2009 and 2013 Russia supplied 75% of weapons imported by India. However, serious delays and cost overruns on major contracts, such as aircraft carrier Vikramaditya to India and Il-76 transport aircraft to China, have dented Russia’s reputation as a reliable partner for India.

As a result, Delhi has sought to diversify its arms purchases. India chose French Rafale fighters in its multi-billion dollar Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) fighter tender and purchased helicopters and transport aircraft, as well as ASW aircraft, from the United States. India chose the American C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft over Russia’s Il-76 plane. Moreover, India is looking to be 75% self-reliant in defence production by 2020-25, which is likely to result in declines in foreign arms purchases from both Russia and the United States.

New markets

Russia is actively seeking to expand its arms sales in South-east Asia, particularly Indonesia and Vietnam. Both are looking towards naval expansion and have in recent years bought aircraft, combat ships and infantry fighting vehicles from Russia. It is also seeking to sell diesel submarines to Thailand and has signed a deal to supply transport helicopters to Pakistan.

Besides Asia, Russia has been actively looking for new customers for its arms in the Middle East. Russia has recently concluded significant contracts with Iraq for helicopters and air defence systems worth 4 billion dollars and Egypt for air defence systems worth 2 billion dollars. Negotiations are also under way for coastal defence systems, attack helicopters and MiG-35 fighter aircraft. Ten years after being forced out of the Iraq market by the US invasion, Russia has once again become a major supplier of air defence systems and helicopters to that country.

It has also signed an agreement expanding military cooperation with Iran, with officials discussing the possibility of restoring the agreement to sell S-300 air defence systems with a possible upgrade to the more advanced S-400 system. Such sales would not violate the existing international sanctions regime.

In Latin America, Russia has long had a reliable customer in Venezuela, which has in recent years bought missiles, tanks and armored vehicles from Russia. Russia is looking for new markets in the region and is hopeful of selling fighter aircraft to Brazil and Argentina. Russia has sold air defence systems to Brazil and hopes to develop a defence industrial partnership that might parallel its military cooperation with India.

Russian competition with the United States

Russia mostly seeks to sell arms to countries that are not able or interested in buying US weapons, either because the customer states are not partners of the United States or because the products are too expensive. Iran, Venezuela and China are not likely to become areas for competition in US-Russian arms sales. Egypt has turned to Russia in recent years because of a deterioration in relations with the United States in the aftermath of the 2013 military coup. Many African and South-east Asian countries choose Russian arms when they cannot afford US-made versions.

India, a large unaligned country with a high level of military expenditures, is an attractive target for defense companies from both countries. Russia is also hoping to make inroads into Brazil and Argentina, two countries that have traditionally bought the majority of their weapons from the United States and its NATO allies.

The sectors in which Russian weapons systems are considered equal or superior to Western equivalents include: air defence, fighter aircraft, helicopters, submarines and cruise missiles. These are the sectors in which Russia’s defence industry can compete with the most advanced Western suppliers, with weapons such as the S-300 air defence system, the Su-35 fighter jets and the Kilo class submarine being noteworthy. In other sectors, such as transport aircraft, drones, surface ships, tanks and armoured vehicles, the quality of Russian products is significantly inferior to that of the United States, and Russian exporters compete primarily on price.

US strategy.

International arms sales can offset reductions in US defence spending, helping to keep the US defence industrial base healthy. Arms sales also fit with the Obama administration’s goal of strengthening allies and partners so they can provide more security for themselves without relying on US support. The US government has revised its export control system and is trying to streamline the Arms Export Control Act to make arms transfers simpler.

The combination of high-level policymaker attention, steady reforms and a volatile international security environment has resulted in an increase in US arms sales, thereby accelerating the competition with Russia.

In fiscal year 2014, US arms sales worldwide totaled 34 billion dollars, up 4 billion dollars from the previous year and about three times greater than the pre-2006 average. By contrast, President Vladimir Putin yesterday announced that in 2014 Russia sold more than 15 billion dollars-worth of arms and that new signed orders stood at around 14 billion dollars.

Outlook.

The United States continues to dominate the defence trade with its traditional partners such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Japan. Yet it remains committed to maintaining or expanding ties to countries that Russia is also courting, such as Brazil, Argentina, India, Indonesia, Egypt and Pakistan.

In 2014, the United States and India agreed to identify co-development and co-production opportunities as part of the US-India Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI). Industry sources report that surveillance UAVs may be the first batch of products sold.

Since these products would be of particular use to India, especially in patrolling disputed areas with Pakistan, the United States may expect to see greater competition with Israel, a major drone manufacturer, shifting the Indian market towards higher-end products, and perhaps leaving fewer areas in which the main competition is with Russia.

CONCLUSION: The Russian and US defence sectors will push for greater exports to offset constraints in the defence budgets of their own governments. India, with growing expenditures and skepticism about Russia’s reliability, appears to be opening further to the United States. Competition between the two manufacturers will also be seen in Latin America and South-east Asia, where the US ‘Asia pivot’ may help Washington win new customers.

Moscow Conference on International Security 2015 Part 3: Speeches by foreign defense ministers

This year, there were a lot of foreign defense ministers participating in the Moscow Conference on International Security. In fact, there were so many that the organizers had to take an unscheduled break as the conference running well over time, with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu notably absent after the panel resumed. In this post, I will summarize the most interesting of the presentations. Videos of all the plenary speeches are available on the Russian Defense Ministry website.

Not surprisingly, the first slot in this lineup was given to Chang Wanquan, the Minister of Defense of the People’s Republic of China. Minister Chang focused on the development of a multipolar world as the center of gravity in international affairs has moved in recent years. He noted that some countries (not mentioning the U.S. by name) have been trying to obtain absolute security, which has complicated the international situation. China has been promoting a comprehensive vision of global security, focused on the need for a fair international order, the idea that common development enables security, and the primacy of dialog and cooperation over threats and the use of force. He noted that the PLA has been focused on safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as crises on China’s periphery have been causing insecurity for the country. He also mentioned the role of the PLA Navy in conducting evacuations from Yemen and Libya and conducting other humanitarian missions such as disaster assistance and providing medical help for the Ebola crisis in West Africa. He highlighted the need to commemorate the victory over Nazism in World War II and the steps that China has been taking to promote development through the AIIB Bank and various Silk Road initiatives. Minister Chang concluded with a discussion of new efforts to conduct military dialog and increase military cooperation between China and the United States as part of efforts to counter terrorist threats and violent extremism. The overall perception from the speech was of China performing a careful balancing act between supporting Russia as the conference host while telegraphing that it was not interested in getting involved in any kind of confrontation with the United States.

Panos Kammenos, the Greek Defense Minister, was the only senior military official from a NATO country to make a presentation. He began with a statement highlighting the strong ties between Greece and Russia based on spiritual and historical connections, as well as on the two countries’ joint fight against fascism. He mentioned the dangers posed by terrorism and by new asymmetrical and hybrid security threats. The financial crisis that has affected the European Union has led to an increase in instability. Traditional security problems have been joined by new threats, such as ethnic and religious conflict, mass migration, and the dissemination of arms to non-state actors. He argued that the greatest security threat is posed by terrorism and religious conflict in the Middle East and the role of Greece as the bastion of Europe in this area. In this context, he mentioned the significance of Greece’s Hellenic initiative to protect Christians in the Middle East. He concluded by noting that security cannot be divided into internal and external areas. The same terrorist groups are attacking both the U.S. and Russia, so there is no choice but to have both countries working together to resolve this crisis.

The Pakistani Defense Minister, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, highlighted the emergence of new security threats in the last years. He noted that the radicals of the Islamic State have created a transregional crisis that has heightened the danger of the fragmentation of the modern state order. Conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen can all be viewed as outcomes of failed regime change, the Arab spring and regional conflict. The old order in the Middle East is dying, while external powers are the only force preventing the emergence of a new order based on religious radicalism. Local extremists in Southeast Asia and Africa are losing foot soldiers to transnational groups such as the Islamic State and Daesh. The region needs a comprehensive social, economic, and political reform package that must be combined with ongoing military actions. 200 thousand Pakistani soldiers are currently fighting terrorists in northwest Pakistan. We need to compromise on principles to ensure that the conflict ends (referring to Charlie Hebdo and Muhammad cartoons).

The Iranian Defense Minister, Hossein Dehghan, started by describing ISIS as a global cancer that has support from foreign states. He blamed the United States and Israel for using these groups to change the strategic balance in the region. He made a very strong statement against Saudi aggression in Yemen, arguing that as a result in the future Saudi Arabia will face the same situation as Saddam Hussein did. He argued that Saudi Arabia has killed many civilians through its aerial bombing campaign and needs to stop supporting terrorism in the Middle East. The international community needs to stop foreign interference in Yemen. Iran, by contrast, is a factor for stability in the region. He then turned to U.S. cyber attacks on Iran and the role of the U.S. as a threat to international security. He proposed a multilateral cooperation initiative between Iran, Russia, China, and India against U.S. missile defense and other international threats. He highlighted that Iran is focused on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The North Korean Defense Minister, Hyon Yong Chol, did not pull any punches in his speech. He started by arguing that the U.S. is the greatest threat to world peace and has caused an increase in the risk of war on the Korean peninsula by its actions. He called the U.S. and South Korea a cancer, because they want to overthrow the DPRK and dominate northeast Asia in order to put added pressure on Russia and China. He called the 1953 armistice worthless and argued that North Korea has been threatened by a U.S. nuclear attack. Efforts to have dialog with the U.S. did not achieve any results as it became clear that the U.S. just wanted to eliminate North Korean nuclear weapons without creating a peace deal. “If we had peace, we would not need nuclear weapons.” If the U.S. were to suspend joint exercises with South Korea, North Korea would stop its nuclear program. Instead, the U.S. is trying to create an Asian NATO.

The Indian Defense Minister, Rao Inderjit Singh, highlighted that most nations have now given up some of their sovereignty to various transnational bodies, as the have recognized that traditional state instruments are not adequate to respond to modern threats. Non-state actors are becoming orchestrators of conflict. States can’t reign them in or are even tacitly encouraging them in some cases. Responses need to combine hard and soft power. Conventional wars have declined in recent years, as have civil wars. Now, multi-polarity is allowing old rivalries to reemerge.  In addition, there are new forms of threat from resource scarcity and climate change. Armed forces have to be prepared to fight both high end threats and irregular warfare. Space, cyberspace, and even underground warfare are now part of the war environment and have to be taken into account. Rapid technological innovation will help wealthy states and local entrepreneurs of violence, while potentially hurting the middle powers.

Russian arms sales

Another Oxford Analytica piece, this one from mid-December.

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Russia is the second-largest arms exporter in the world, behind only the United States. In the period 2009-13, Russia accounted for 27% of total world arms sales.

However, Russian arms sales have been highly dependent on a few major customers, with India, China and Algeria accounting for over 60% of Russian purchases in the last five years. Another 15% of Russian exports went to other Asian countries, primarily Vietnam, Indonesia and former Soviet Union states.

Russia is particularly hopeful of expanding its sales to Indonesia and Vietnam — which are both looking towards naval expansion, which have to date included systems ranging from aircraft to combat ships to infantry fighting vehicles.

The main targets of Russian weapon sales are gradually shifting. Sales to China, have been in decline for years as Beijing has pursued a programme of shifting to domestic manufacturing of advanced weaponry.

India

India has replaced China as Moscow’s main foreign customer. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that between 2009 and 2013 Russia supplied 75% of weapons imported by India. However, serious delays such as the transfer of the modernised aircraft carrier — the Vikramaditya — have dented Russia’s reputation as a reliable partner.

Therefore, Delhi seeks a diversity of supply from sources including the United States and several European countries. This is evidenced in India’s preference for French Rafale fighters in the multi-billion dollar Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) fighter tender.

India’s MMRCA tender is for procuring 126 fighters to replace squadrons of MiG-21s. The deal will see France supply a number of aircraft fully built and ready to fly — while the remainder will be built under a technology transfer agreement by Hindustan Aeronautics.

Moreover, India is looking to be 75% self-reliant in defence production by 2020-25. It will also seek to become a weapons exporter and probably promote partnerships with Russia. The BrahMos Aerospace programme has been a particular noteworthy area of close cooperation between Russia and India with the creation of the BrahMos Supersonic Cruise Missile.

Pakistan

Pakistan may also provide a new opening for Russia. On November 20, Russia and Pakistan signed a military cooperation agreement, reportedly involving a deal for Moscow to supply 20 Mi-35 transport helicopters to Islamabad.

Middle East

Besides Asia, Russia has been actively looking for new customers for its arms in the Middle East. Russia has recently concluded significant contracts with Iraq for helicopters and air defence systems worth 4 billion dollars and Egypt for air defence systems worth 2 billion dollars.

Latin America

In Latin America, Russia remains hopeful of selling fighter aircraft to Brazil and Argentina. Russia has sold air defence systems to Brazil and hopes to develop a defence industrial partnership that might parallel its military cooperation with India.

Competitive sectors

The sectors in which Russian weapons systems are considered equal or superior to Western equivalents include air defence, fighter aircraft, helicopters, submarines and cruise missiles. These are the sectors in which Russia’s defence industry can compete with the most advanced Western suppliers, with weapons such as the S-300 air defence system, the Su-35 fighter jets and the Kilo class submarine being noteworthy. Russia can also be competitive in sectors such as tanks, armored vehicles, small arms, artillery, and small combat ships. These are sectors where Russian weapons are not as good as Western equivalents, but are generally significantly cheaper. This price difference has allowed them to be competitive in many countries despite lower quality and/or inferior characteristics.

Ukraine delays

However, Russian arms sales have largely depended on selling late Soviet designs, with new designs proving more difficult to manufacture. The freeze on military cooperation with Ukraine may lead to further delays as many Russian weapon systems depend on Ukrainian components and the transition to Russian domestic substitutes is expected to take two to three years.

Energy concerns drive China-Central Asia defence ties

Here’s the latest of my Central Asia series of Oxford Analytica briefs. This one is from late February.

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In shaping its relations with Central Asian states, Beijing has primarily focused on developing energy imports and forging economic ties in other areas. At the same time, China faces several security concerns emanating from the region, most importantly, Islamic radicalism and regional separatism. Beijing has been attempting to address these concerns via multilateral and bilateral cooperation with Central Asian states. The conflicts and tensions are likely to become more acute as NATO begins to withdraw from Afghanistan.

Impact

• China’s desire to avoid alienating Russia has prompted it to de-emphasise military ties in favour of economic and trade relations.
• Most Central Asian states prefer the focus on trade relations with China, although Uzbekistan has recently sought to increase military ties.
• Chinese leaders favour multilateral initiatives, which countries in the region regard as less threatening than bilateral approaches.

Analysis

Although China has long sought to increase its influence in Central Asia, it has sought to do so largely through economic and trade relations, rather than in the security sphere. As a result, China’s military ties with Central Asian states are relatively limited. This is due to a combination of factors:

•  Beijing is keen to avoid alienating Moscow, which continues to see itself as the primary guarantor of Central Asian security.
• Central Asian leaders are concerned that China is already enjoying a disproportionate degree of influence in the region. This has led them to be extremely cautious in extending military cooperation.
• China is reluctant to become the region’s main security guarantor, due to a combination of its long-standing policy of non-interference abroad, and more significant security challenges elsewhere, especially in its maritime region.

Multilateral initiatives

The primary mode of interaction between China and the Central Asian states in the security sphere revolves around multilateral initiatives organised through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). These are closely related to China’s desire to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism. As a result, most multilateral security activities in the region that involve China revolve around counter-terrorism.

Peace Mission exercises

The Peace Mission series of counter-terrorism exercises have been held since 2003. The most recent took place in Tajikistan in June 2012 and included participants from all of the SCO member states except Uzbekistan. This was the smallest of the eight exercises held to date, highlighting the lack of emphasis on the military component of regional cooperation within the SCO. Uzbekistan has consistently refused to participate in the SCO exercises. The Uzbek leadership’s fear of domination by external powers — Russia, in particular — has made it keen to avoid any possibility that potential conflicts among Central Asian states might be internationalised.

RATS

China has also established a regional organisation dedicated to fighting terrorism. The Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) of the SCO is dedicated to coordinating the anti-terrorist activities of member states, with a particular focus on radical Islamist organisations. RATS was established in 2004 and is headquartered in Tashkent, capital of Uzbekistan. In recent years, it has expanded its activities to include counter-narcotics coordination.

Bilateral cooperation

Kazakhstan is the most significant partner in China’s bilateral security activities in Central Asia. The two countries have had regular military exchanges since 1993 and have engaged in numerous, though mostly small-scale, military exercises since 2002. As with the multi-lateral activities, China’s military engagement with Kazakhstan focuses on non-traditional threats such as terrorism and drug trafficking. China provides a significant amount of military assistance to Kazakhstan, but it is limited almost entirely to non-lethal equipment.

Kyrgyzstan

China’s security relations with Kyrgyzstan are more limited and opaque. They are focused primarily on countering Uighur separatist networks. Beijing has also provided equipment to the Kyrgyzstani security forces, but as with Kazakhstan, this has been limited to non-lethal goods such as vehicles and computers.

Turkmenistan and Tajikistan

Security relations with Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are not a priority for China. With Turkmenistan, the basis of the bilateral relationship is natural gas exports. Security assistance is provided by Beijing in order to ensure that pipelines and other energy infrastructure are protected. China’s interests in Tajikistan are also very limited due, in part, to the widespread hostility towards the Chinese in Tajikistan, which is largely driven by the success of a recent Chinese effort to renegotiate the border between the two countries.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan withdrew from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in June 2012, not long after President Islam Karimov had signed a strategic partnership agreement with China on the sidelines of an SCO summit. These circumstances, in conjunction with a prior visit to Tashkent by the chief of the Chinese General Staff, have led to speculations that Karimov decided to strengthen the security partnership with China at the expense of the traditionally strong ties with Russia’s military and security establishment. So far, China has not given any indications that it is eager to make this relationship deeper than its security relations with the other four Central Asian states.

Afghanistan concerns

Beijing is concerned with the potential spread of Islamic radicalism and political instability in Central Asia in the aftermath of NATO’s planned withdrawal from Afghanistan. It is particularly worried that instability in Central Asia would negatively affect its ability to import energy. The potential for the instability to spread to Xinjiang is an important secondary concern. Both of these threats may be realised if Afghanistan returned to a state of civil war or if the Taliban came back to power and began to export its ideology and methods of governance to Central Asia.

China will continue to tread cautiously, since the political reservations that limited its military involvement in Central Asia are equally relevant for Afghanistan. It will seek to ensure that its security initiatives in the region remain largely multilateral.

What next

China will continue to emphasise economic relations with Central Asia while soft-pedalling military ties, which will largely focus on the security of Chinese energy imports and continued stability in Xinjiang. Despite increased security concerns in the aftermath of the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, China will not attempt to become a regional security guarantor. It will leave that role primarily to Russia and focus instead on establishing its economic dominance in Central Asia.

Great Powers vie for sway in Central Asia

Here’s an Oxford Analytica brief from early February on basing in Central Asia.

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As NATO and the United States prepare to withdraw the bulk of their military forces from Afghanistan in 2014, both regional powers and local actors in Central Asia are preparing for the aftermath. NATO countries have already negotiated short-term access to new and existing military bases in the region to facilitate the step-by-step withdrawal of their troops. At the same time, the United States and Russia are working out deals with local players to maintain their military presence in an effort to preserve regional security, as well as guarantee their long-term influence in Central Asia.

Impact

• The Russian military presence in Kyrgyzstan is becoming more entrenched due to the recent changes in the legal status of its facilities.
• US influence in Central Asia will decline after NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, as the region is not a US foreign policy priority.
• Given its de facto economic dominance in Central Asia, China is cautious about stepping up its military involvement in regional affairs.

What next

The Western focus on Afghanistan will decline after the NATO operation is completed. The United States will seek to maintain a presence at the Manas base in Kyrgyzstan, but the number of personnel there will depend primarily on the supply needs of the US troops remaining in Afghanistan after 2014. Russia, on the other hand, will aim to solidify its position as the dominant regional security provider. Finally, China will continue to strengthen military ties with Central Asian states, though it will stop short of the potentially incendiary step of sending its forces to the region.

Analysis

Over the past few months, discussions of post-2014 military bases in Central Asia have resurfaced. Although Moscow and Washington remain the key contenders in their efforts to ensure continued military access to the region, several other countries involved in NATO operations in Afghanistan have sought to secure access to the bases as they are beginning to plan troop withdrawals. For example:

• Germany wants to maintain its lease on the base in Termez, Uzbekistan; and
• France recently signed an agreement with Kazakhstan to develop a military transit hub in Shymkent.

Both countries are almost certainly going to pull out of these bases once the withdrawal of their troops is complete. Russia and the United States, on the other hand, will likely stay for the longer term.

US-Russian Manas rivalry

The Manas transit centre in Kyrgyzstan served as the key link in the US effort to bring equipment and troops to Afghanistan. It is poised to play a similar role during the US withdrawal from the region. At the same time, there is a great deal of competition for access to Manas after 2014.

United States

Kyrgyzstan’s President Almazbek Atambayev sees the base as a regional airport. The United States appears to support Atambayev’s plan and has already submitted a proposal to transform the facility into a civilian aviation hub. This may prove beneficial in future negotiations with Kyrgyzstan should Washington decide to retain some local military presence. The mid-January visit to Bishkek by the US Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake was widely perceived as the first step toward bilateral discussions on the future of the Manas Transit Centre.

Russia

Moscow is also keen to provide assistance for Manas redevelopment as it seeks to ensure base access while, at the same time, hoping to prevent the United States from remaining in the country. A delegation of Russian state officials visited Bishkek in December 2012 for discussions about the possibility of establishing a joint Kyrgyzstani-Russian logistics centre at Manas.

Russia: Access to Kyrgyzstan facilities

In December 2012, Russia succeeded in convincing Kyrgyzstan’s government to allow it to consolidate into a unified military base its existing local facilities. These consist of:

• a weapon test range in Karakol;
• a signals centre in Kara-Balt;
• a radio-seismic laboratory in Mayly-Suu; and
• an airbase in Kant.

Until now, these facilities were governed by several agreements that made them more vulnerable to political pressure from the Kyrgyzstani side. To reduce the risk, Moscow had been looking to change their status for the last two years. The new agreement will last for at least 15 years.

The deal appears to have ended speculation that Russia was planning to build a second military base in southern Kyrgyzstan near Osh. Although Moscow was keen to build a base in that region for several years, the importance of this initiative diminished after the United States announced in the summer of 2010 that it will not proceed with its plans to establish a counter-terrorism training centre in the area.

Russia: Long-term presence in Tajikistan

In October 2012, Russia finalised with Tajikistan an arrangement to extend its lease on local military facilities for 30 years. Tajikistan agreed to forego significant rent payments in exchange for:

• 200 million dollars toward the modernisation of its armed forces;
• additional economic assistance, including Moscow’s help with the construction of hydroelectric power stations; and
• fewer restrictions for Tajik migrant labourers in Russia.

Fuel supplies hurdles

Several obstacles have been delaying the ratification of the agreement in Tajikistan’s parliament. They include duty-free Russian fuel shipments. Moscow insisted on a clause that would prevent Dushanbe from re-exporting the fuel and, after initial reluctance, Tajikistan relented in late January 2013.

Migration issues

The two sides remain at odds over restrictions imposed on Tajik guest workers. The current migration agreement stipulates that Tajikistan nationals are allowed to stay in Russia for 15 days without registration and are eligible for a work permit of up to three years. Dushanbe is seeking to improve the terms of the agreement while, on its part, Moscow is requesting that Tajikistan control the flow of migrants by sending them through dedicated organisations. Migration law is a critical issue for Tajikistan; remittances from its migrant workers in Russia comprise almost half of the country’s GDP.

Despite delays in negotiations, both sides appear committed to completing the deal, which is likely to be ratified in Tajikistan’s parliament in the next 1-2 months.

China: Military reluctance

Although China has strengthened its military ties with Central Asian states through frequent multi-national exercises and occasional arms sales, it has not attempted to establish a permanent military presence in the region. The strategy is part of an effort to assuage the fears shared by Central Asian leaders of excessive Chinese dominance. It also addresses Russia’s concerns of being displaced by China as the security guarantor, having already been sidelined in the economic realm.

Russia and China vie for influence in Central Asia

I’m still swamped with various projects, so in the meantime, here’s another Oxford Analytica brief. This one is from mid-December…

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Although China and the United States have focused greater attention on Central Asia in recent years, Russia remains the dominant power in the region. Its size and the cultural, political and economic connections that remain from the Soviet period are such that Central Asian countries are reluctant to take any actions that would antagonise Moscow. For Russian leaders, Central Asia serves as a buffer zone that protects Russia’s southern border from potential threats.

Impacts:

• Increasing Chinese economic presence in Central Asia will curtail Russia’s efforts to limit China’s regional political influence.
• After NATO’s exit from Afghanistan, Russia and Central Asian states will cooperate to prevent radical Islam from destabilising the region.
• Shifting patterns of energy demand and supply will reduce Russia’s ability to use energy as a tool for political influence.

ANALYSIS:

Russia’s various initiatives in Central Asia are shaped by three interest groups with widely divergent interests that often work at cross-purposes to each other:

• The military and defence industry is focused on the role of great power competition in the region; it seeks to promote arms sales and to increase Russia’s military presence.
• The energy industry focuses on securing exclusive rights to gas transit from Central Asia to Europe.
• The security services concentrate on the transnational threats to Russia from radical Islam, terrorism and drug smuggling.

Maintaining monopoly

Throughout the last decade, Russia sought to maintain its energy-transit monopoly on the export of petroleum and natural gas from Central Asia. Until 2005, all major export pipelines from the region went through Russia giving it control over transit fees. Russia’s monopoly over natural gas transit to Europe also gave it political and economic leverage over downstream countries dependent on supplies of Russian natural gas for domestic consumption.

The construction of alternative pipelines over the last decade has eliminated Russia’s monopoly on hydrocarbon transit from Central Asia. Energy-producing states in the region can now sell their products to China and Iran. At the same time, changes in patterns of supply and demand for natural gas in Europe have decreased the political and economic significance of Russia’s remaining monopoly on natural gas supply to some European countries. The development of new methods of shale gas extraction in the United States has increased the supply of LNG to Europe at the same time as the 2008-09 global financial crisis has led to a sharp drop in demand for natural gas.

These factors decreased Russia’s ability to set prices and to use its control of energy supply for political ends, thus reducing the importance of future Caspian pipeline transit. Russia is now likely to focus on energy production in the Caspian Sea region and has already begun to develop several oil and gas fields that it controls jointly with Kazakhstan.

Keeping China at bay

China has sought to increase its economic and political influence in Central Asia without alienating Russia for a number of reasons. For example:

• Central Asia has become one of China’s primary energy suppliers;
• Central Asia serves as a security buffer zone between China and both Russia and the United States; and
• China seeks to prevent Uighur separatists in Xinjiang from using Central Asia as a safe haven.

To further these goals, China made large investments into the Central Asian economies and, in particular, in energy infrastructure. The region provides raw materials to China in exchange for finished products such as machinery, food and consumer goods.

Russian leaders fear that their country’s position in Central Asia is gradually being displaced as China’s political influence and economic power grow. To maintain its sway in Central Asia, Russia has focused on ‘tying’ China into regional networks and institutions while retaining levers of influence through institutions in which China is not a member.

In the security realm, Russia has combined participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with its role in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). While the SCO provides a neutral forum where Russia can discuss security and plan joint operations and exercises with China, the CSTO allows Russia to address Central Asian security issues without China’s participation. At the same time, Russia has sought to counter China’s economic influence in Central Asia by setting up the Customs Union, which, in 2014, is expected to include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Recent discussions concerning the establishment of the Eurasian Union in 2015 are also part of the effort to cement Central Asian economic ties to Russia.

Ensuring political stability

Although most of the regimes in the region have endured for over 20 years, Central Asia is now entering a period of potential political instability.

• Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are all bracing for a potential resurgence of Islamist radicalism in the aftermath of the likely US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.
• Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan — both states ruled by authoritarian presidents in their mid-1970s — are highly vulnerable to succession risks.
• Kyrgyzstan is still recovering from two episodes of violent regime collapse in the last decade.

The potential destabilising influence of radical Islamist groups and drug smuggling networks is a key concern for Russia. Moscow believes that the current Central Asian leadership has been able to contain the threat of radical Islam and is worried that a regime change, combined with the withdrawal of NATO troops, would facilitate the spread of radical Islam to Russia.

These concerns have led Russia to provide various forms of security assistance to the region’s more vulnerable states. In the last year alone Russia has:

• extended leases on military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan;
• sold weapons to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan;
• sought to persuade Uzbekistan to re-engage with the CSTO; and
• agreed to provide 1.3 billion dollars to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to modernise their military forces and ensure their security after the departure of Western troops.

The extension of Russia’s military base agreements with Central Asian countries, together with Kyrgyzstan’s decision to ask the United States to vacate the Manas base after the NATO departure from Afghanistan, will leave Russia as the sole security provider to vulnerable states in the region.

CONCLUSION: Russia’s security relations with Central Asian states will strengthen as they face the consequences of NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. At the same time, Moscow’s efforts to remain the dominant economic partner of the region’s key players will likely falter as China strengthens its position as the main recipient of Central Asian energy exports and a key supplier of imported consumer products.

Problems of Post-Communism, November 2012 Table of Contents

Volume 59 Number 6 / November-December 2012 of Problems of Post-Communism is now available on the ME Sharpe web site at http://mesharpe.metapress.com.

This issue contains:

The 2012 Political Reform in Russia: The Interplay of Liberalizing Concessions and Authoritarian Corrections	p. 3
Grigorii V. Golosov
Modernization and Historical Memory in Russia: Two Sides of the Same Coin	p. 15
Miguel Vázquez Liñán
Reforming Post-Communist Welfare States: Family Policy in Poland, Hungary, and Romania Since 2000	p. 27
Tomasz Inglot, Dorottya Szikra, Cristina Raţ
Civil Society with Chinese Characteristics?: An Examination of China’s Urban Homeowners’ Committees and Movements	p. 50
Ngeow Chow Bing
A Salute to Ronald Linden, Outgoing Associate Editor of Problems of Post-Communism and a Welcome to Sherrill Stroschein, Incoming Associate Editor of Problems of Post-Communism	p. 64
Dmitry Gorenburg, Editor

Russian-Central Asian Security Relations

I was recently asked by the Slovak Atlantic Commission to write a short article reviewing security relations between Russia and Central Asia for their Euro Atlantic Quarterly. With their permission, I repost the article below.

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Russian policies in Central Asia are shaped by three divergent perspectives. The geopolitical/military perspective focuses on the great power competition in the region; the perspective of the Russian energy industry focuses on securing exclusive rights for gas transit from the region to Europe; and the security perspective focuses on the transnational threats to Russia caused by radical Islamism, terrorism, and drug smuggling through the region.[1]

The internal tension among these perspectives is the main source of inconsistency in Russian policies in the region. Depending on which perspective is in ascendance, Russian officials alternate between focusing on soft security threats, which are best dealt with through the establishment of cooperative mechanisms with states both in and outside the region, and taking steps to limit the influence of outside states in the region as part of its effort to retain a monopoly on energy transit and to come out on top in its rivalry with the United States in the region.

Russia’s energy interests in Central Asia

Until recently, Russia’s primary energy policy goal in the region was to control the export of petroleum and natural gas from Central Asia to Europe. Until 2005, all major export pipelines from the region went through Russia, giving it significant leverage over transit fees and sales prices. Control over natural gas transit was also important politically, as it could potentially be used as leverage over downstream countries dependent on supplies of Russian natural gas for their domestic consumption.

The construction of a number of alternative pipelines over the last decade has eliminated Russia’s monopoly on hydrocarbon transit from Central Asia. Energy producing states in the region can now sell their products to China and Iran. At the same time, changes in patterns of supply and demand for natural gas in Europe have decreased the political and economic significance of Russia’s remaining monopoly on natural gas supply to some European countries. The development of new methods of extracting shale gas in the United States increased the supply of LNG to Europe at the same time as the 2008-09 global financial crisis led to a sharp drop in demand. These factors combined to sharply reduce Russia’s ability to set prices or to use its control of supply for political ends. This effect is likely to last for at least the medium term.

This change in European natural gas dynamics has reduced the political importance of future Caspian pipeline routes for Russia. Instead, Russia is likely to focus on increasing the economic benefits of energy production in the Caspian. To this end it has focused on developing several oil and gas fields it controls jointly with Kazakhstan. The most significant of these is the Kurmangazy offshore oil and gas condensate field, with estimated reserves of 7-10 billion barrels of oil. Russian energy companies also have partial control or minority stakes in several other Kazakhstani fields, all currently in the survey and exploration stage.

Competition with China

In recent years, Russian leaders have become increasingly concerned about the rise of Chinese influence in Central Asia. China’s political strategy in Central Asia is focused on turning the region into a strong, accessible, and secure region for Chinese influence without generating strong Russian opposition. The region is significant for China for three reasons. First of all, it has become a critical source of energy resources for China. Second, China views the region as a security buffer zone between it and both Russia and the United States. Finally, China seeks Central Asian support in its ongoing fight against Uyghur separatism in Xinjiang.[2] To further these goals, China has made large investments in the Central Asian economy, and particularly in energy infrastructure. Most Sino-Central Asian trade consists of the supply of raw materials from Central Asia to China and the subsequent import of finished products such as machinery, food, and consumer goods from China into Central Asia.

Russian leaders fear that their traditional influence in Central Asian politics is slowly ebbing away as their economic position in the region is replaced by China. While Russian is still frequently the lingua franca in Central Asian markets, the products being sold are mostly Chinese.[3] To maintain its influence in the region, Russia has focused on tying China into regional networks and institutions while retaining levers of influence through institutions in which China is not a member. In the security realm, the most important role in this regard is served by the interplay between the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which provides the two countries with a neutral forum in which they can have security discussions and plan joint actions and exercises, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which allows Russia to have a role in providing security Central Asian states without Chinese interference. At the same time, Russia seeks to counter China’s economic influence in Central Asia through the formation of a customs union with Kazakhstan and its potential future extension into Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.[4]

Seeking to Ensure Political Stability

Russian leaders are concerned about the fragility of political regimes in Central Asia. Although the states in the region appear strong on the surface, their state structures are relatively weak, best by corruption, and dependent on patronage networks for their continued functioning. These types of regimes may succumb to a rapid loss of power, much as the Mubarak regime did in Egypt in 2011 and as the Akayev and then Bakiyev regimes did in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and again in 2010. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two central states in Central Asia, are entering periods of greater political uncertainty as they face inevitable battles to succeed their aging presidents.

Russian leaders are concerned that the sudden death or overthrow of one of the Central Asian leaders will result in prolonged internal instability and could provide an opportunity for radical Islamist groups to attempt to seize power or launch a civil war. They see the current set of Central Asian rulers as a bulwark against the threat of radical Islam coming from Afghanistan and fear that instability in the region could make it easier for radical Islamic groups to infiltrate Russia.

Despite the increasing attention paid to Central Asia by the United States and China in recent years, Russia for now remains the dominant power in the region. The other former Soviet states in the region are loath to take any actions that would antagonize Russia. Russia has used the cultural, political, and economic connections left from the Soviet period to maintain its role in the region. Russian leaders consider Central Asia to be a critical buffer zone protecting Russia’s southern border from potential threats. For this reason, they will continue to act to ensure that Russian interests in the region are safeguarded.

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[1] “The Caspian Sea region towards 2020,” ECON-Report no. 2007-008, 17 January 2007.

[2] James Bosbotinis, “Sustaining the Dragon, Dodging the Eagle, and Barring the Bear? Assessing the Role and Important of Central Asia in Chinese National Strategy,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Spring 2010.

[3] James Brooke, “China Displaces Russia in Central Asia,” Voice of America, 16 November 2010.

[4] Dina Tokbaeva, “Central Asia Focus of Russia-China Rivalry,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 21 December 2011.

Armed Forces of Central Asia and the Regional Threat Situation

In the most recent issue of NVO, Aleksandr Khramchikhin has a very useful description of the forces located in Russia’s Central Operational Strategic Command. This is in the context of an article examining the total array of forces located in or near Central Asia, including Kazakh, Uzbek, Pakistani, and Chinese forces in the region. I haven’t seen all this data in a single place before, so it seems worthwhile to reproduce it here, followed by a discussion of the extent to which these forces present a threat to Russia.

Eventually, I’ll update my series on the structure of Russia’s Ground Forces to take into account the new organizational structure, but until I have time to do that, this will have to do.

Russia’s Central Operational Strategic Command

Ground Forces

• 1 tank brigade
• 7 motorized rifle brigades
• 2 special forces brigades (one of which is being demobilized)
• 2 rocket brigades
• 1 artillery brigade
• 1 MLRS brigade
• 2 missile brigades
• 5 bases for storage and equipment repair

These forces are equipped with: 400 T-72 tanks, more than 500 BMP infantry fighting vehicles, 200 airborne infantry fighting vehicles, 400 armored personnel carriers, 400 self-propelled guns, 100 other pieces of artillery, 200 mortars, 250 multiple rocket launchers, 300 anti-tank guns, and 270 air defense missiles of various kinds

Air Defense Forces

• 5 S-300PS regiments
• 1 S-300 V regiment

Air Forces

• 6 airbases housing 48 MiG-31 interceptors, 32 Mi-24 helicopter gunships and 80 transport aircraft and helicopters.
• 2 long-range aviation bases in Saratov oblast, housing 14 Tu-160,  16 Tu-95, and 30 Tu-22M3 long range bombers.
• Military transport aviation base in Orenburg, housing 27 Il-76MD transport planes.
• Various reserve bases housing over 500 airplanes and over 150 helicopters, though the majority of these are older types that are unlikely to be operational.

In addition to these forces, the Center OSC also controls the 201st military base located in Tajikistan and the 999th airbase located in Kyrgyzstan.

Kazakhstani armed forces

Ground Forces

• 10 mechanized infantry brigades
• 7 artillery brigades
• 1 MLRS brigade
• 2 anti-tank brigades
• 4 airborne brigades
• 1 missile brigade
• 1 engineering brigade
• 1 shore defense brigade
• 1 peacekeeping brigade

These forces are equipped with 1000 tanks (T-80, T-72, T-62), 2500 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, 250 self-propelled guns, 500 towed artillery pieces, and around 200 Uragan and Grad surface-to-air missiles. Air defenses include several S-300 systems.

The Kazakh air force and air defense forces are organized into 10 regiments. They are equipped with:

• 30 Su-24 bombers
• 12 Su-24M reconnaissance planes
• 12 Su-27 fighter planes
• 40 MiG-29 fighter planes
• 40+ MiG-31 interceptors
• 5 MiG-25 interceptors
• 20 MiG-23 fighter-bombers (being retired)
• 15 Su-25 close air support planes
• 40 transport planes
• 40 Mi-24 helicopter gunships
• 12 Mi-26 heavy transport helicopters

The Kazakh navy consists of 9 patrol boats, including one Turkish-built boat, 4 1950s vintage German boats, 2 new Saigak boats built in Russia, 1 Dauntless class boat built in the US, and 1 Berkut-class boat built in Kazakhstan.

Uzbekistani armed forces

Ground forces

• 11 motorized infantry brigades
• 1 mountain infantry brigade
• 1 tank brigade
• 1 airborne brigade
• 3 air assault brigades
• 5 engineering brigades

These forces are armed with 340 tanks (half of which are old T-62s), 400 infantry fighting vehicles, more than 500 armored personnel carriers, 140 self-propelled guns, 200 towed artillery pieces, and 80 air defense missiles.

The air forces consist of:

• 30 Su-24 bombers and reconnaissance planes
• 20 Su-25 close air support planes
• 30 MiG-29 fighters
• 25 Su-27 fighters
• 40 transport aircraft
• 30-50 Mi-24 helicopter gunships
• 90 transport and multi-purpose helicopters

Pakistani armed forces

The ground forces are comprised of 19 infantry divisions, 2 tank divisions, and 35 brigades of various types. These forces are armed with 165 tactical ballistic missiles, 2500 tanks (including 320 T-80UD), 1300 armored personnel carriers, 260 self-propelled guns, 1600 towed artillery pieces, 2350 mortars, 50 multiple launch rocket systems, 1200 MANPADS, 1900 anti-aircraft weapons, and 25 AN-1 Cobra helicopter gunships.

The air force operates 400 combat aircraft, including 50 F-16s and more than 100 Chinese JF-17s.

Iranian armed forces

Khramchikhin briefly addresses the armaments of the Iranian armed forces, These include 1700 tanks, 700 infantry fighting vehicles, 600 APCs, 2400 artillery pieces (including 300 self-propelled), 5000 mortars, 900 MLRS, 900 anti-tank guided weapons, 2000 air defense artillery pieces, 300 combat airplanes, 100 combat helicopters, and over 250 air defense missile systems.

Chinese armed forces (Lanzhou Military Region)

Finally, Khramchikhin discusses the Chinese forces focused on Central Asia. These are located in the Lanzhou Military region.

Ground Forces

• 2 tank divisions
• 2 motorized infantry divisions
• 3 infantry divisions
• 1 mountain infantry division
• 3 motorized infantry brigades
• 2 artillery brigades
• 3 air defense brigades
• 2 reserve infantry divisions
• 2 reserve anti-aircraft artillery divisions

The Air Force is organized into 1 bomber division and 2 fighter divisions. There are three regiments of H-6H bombers, 2 regiments of J-11 (Su-27) fighters, 4 regiments of J-7 (MiG-21) fighters. Ground air defenses are comprised of one regiment of HQ-2 missiles.

The Regional Balance of Forces

Khramchikhin engages in this description in order to provide a rough description of the balance of forces in the region. Oddly enough, he does not include the NATO coalition forces in Afghanistan in this assessment. But he does point out a couple of interesting things. First of all, the Chinese forces in just the Lanzhou military region, which is generally a low priority for the Chinese government and receives few modern weapons, are more powerful than all of the other forces in the region put together (once again, excluding the NATO forces).

Second, none of the other countries in the region present realistic military threats to Russia. Neither Iran nor Pakistan are likely to have any reason to engage in conflict with Russia, though Pakistan’s forces are, at least on paper, more powerful than those of Russia’s Center OSC. Pakistan is more concerned with India and its own internal instability. The only possible scenario where it might present a threat to Russia would involve a violent overthrow of its government by the Taliban and its allies, followed by its joining an anti-Russian effort in Central Asia. If the Taliban were to take over in Pakistan, it would have many more pressing concerns than attacking Russia or even Central Asia. This scenario is therefore sufficiently far-fetched as to be not worth considering for the moment.

Despite a recent deterioration in military relations because of Russia’s adherence to UN sanctions, Iran is also not interested in engaging in hostilities with Russia. It has more pressing concerns in every other direction.

Three of the Central Asian states (Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan) have no military forces worth the name. All five states have sufficiently good relations with Russia that they pose no real threat. The only potential threat to Russia from Central Asia comes from the possibility of a mass radical Islamist uprising in the Ferghana Valley, especially in the event of a NATO failure in Afghanistan that results in the Taliban’s return to power there. In that case, Khramchikhin argues for joining forces with Kazakhstan to keep the radicals in the south, while leaving the governments of the other Central Asian to survive as best they can on their own.

The Chinese Threat?

This brings Khramchikhin back to China.  He has previously written some fairly alarmist pieces about the potential Chinese threat to Russia, so this time he focuses on the possibility that China would attack Kazakhstan. This seems to be a sufficiently fantastic scenario that it could be dismissed out of hand, but instead he argues that China would easily win such a conflict while absorbing Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with minimal effort. This means that Russia would have to come to Kazakhstan’s assistance or face the prospect of a 12,000km border with China stretching from Astrakhan to Vladivostok. (I’m not sure what happens to Mongolia in this scenario, but I assume it’s nothing good.) And at this point, Khramchikhin argues that Russia might as well capitulate on the spot.

I have never understood the extent of Russian paranoia about Chinese intentions. China is certainly a rising power, but it has accomplished its rise by developing its economy while remaining fairly quiet and conservative on the international scene. While there are certainly circumstances under which China would use its military forces offensively, particularly in Taiwan, the only scenario I can imagine where it feels the need to use armed force in Central Asia would involve defending itself against Islamist forces that have come to power in the region and are assisting Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang. In this scenario, Russia, Kazakhstan and China are all allies uniting to stop the Islamist threat, rather than adversaries.

In other words, Russians (and Kazakhs) should continue to sleep safely, knowing that China is not going to attack — either now or anytime in the foreseeable future.