The most recent issue of the Moscow Defense Brief has an interesting article by Maksim Shepovalenko on “Russian Preparations for Reduced Foreign Military Presence in Afghanstan.” It starts with the usual line on how the Taliban could spread instability to Central Asia if it came to power after the coming withdrawal of ISAF, which is an argument that I and others have found to be exaggerated at times. The threat of Islamist infiltration of Central Asia is often used by Central Asian and Russian governing elites to justify their security policies in the region, whereas most Islamist groups in the region are now far more focused on developments in Afghanistan itself and in parts of Pakistan. Islamist groups external to the region are primarily focused on fighting in Syria and, to a lesser extent, Iraq. So the greater threat to Central Asia comes from internal instability, such as the violent protests that have regularly shaken Kyrgyzstan in recent years, conflicts among the Central Asian states (as highlighted by the recent border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), and the possibility of fighting resulting from a succession crisis in Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan. But although it doesn’t say anything new on the nature of the threat facing Central Asia, the MDB article does gets interesting once it starts to talk about the capabilities of Russian forces in or near Central Asia.
The first line of defense in Central Asia would consist of the forces already in theater, including especially the 201st Military Base located in Tajikistan, which is essentially a brigade. It could be reinforced relatively quickly by two special operations brigades deployed from the Central OSK and one or both of the 98th Guard Airborne Assault Division and the 31st Independent Guard Airborne Assault Brigade of the Airborne Troops. There’s an interesting discussion in the article of Russian plans to establish a rapid reaction force that might be structured as a fifth OSK “with a universal geographical remit.” Such a force would include four independent airborne assault brigades (three existing and one new). In preparation for the establishment of this force, these brigades were recently transferred from the jurisdiction of the four military districts to the Airborne Troops HQ. These brigades’ recon companies are being bolstered to battalion size while special-ops and comms regiments are being turned into brigades through the addition of army aviation companies. UAV companies are also being formed and there are plans for each Airborne division to get a third regiment.
Additional support would come from the CSTO’s rapid deployment force, which includes, in addition to the 201st Military Base and the 999th Air Base in Kant, two Kazakhstani airborne assault battalions, two Kyrgyzstani alpine rifle battalions, and a motor rifle battalion and two airborne assault battalions from Tajikistan. Shepovalenko also highlights the importance of the 2nd and 41st Armies of the Central OSK as a mobilizable reserve for potential action in Central Asia. In addition to these two armies, the Central OSK also has a tank brigade and heavy motor rifle brigade in reserve, which could also be mobilized in the event of a crisis in Central Asia. F0rces from the CSTO’s Collective Fast Deployment Force (KSOR) could also provide reinforcements.
That each of the Central OSK armies consists of three motor rifle brigades is well known. What I haven’t seen mentioned before is the type of brigades. According to the article, the 2nd Army consists of one light, one medium and one heavy brigade, while the 41st Army consists of one medium and two heavy brigades. This transition to different types of brigades has been discussed since military reform began in 2009, but this is the first time I’ve seen mention of specific brigades having been converted to one or another type. Just as a reminder, heavy brigades are based on tanks, medium brigades are based on tracked armored IFVs and wheeled APCs, and light brigades are based on armored cars. The recently published report on Russian military capabilities by the Swedish Defense Research Agency argues that the transition to these brigades is likely to happen in the 2015-20 time frame, concurrently with the introduction of new ground forces equipment such as the Armata tank, Kurganets AIFV and Boomerang APC. (p.147-148, since I can’t link to the specific part of the report) So if the transition to different types of brigades using older equipment has already happened, it would be interesting to find out the types of motor rifle brigades located in other military districts.
The second half of the article provides a lot of information on the types of equipment that these various units use, as well as on Russian arms supplies to Central Asian states and is well worth a read. I agree with the conclusion that the security situation in the Central Asian states is likely to deteriorate in the near future, even though I disagree about the precise nature of the threat. Those interested in Russian preparations for responding to potential security problems in the region should take a look at the whole article. Given Russia’s unwillingness to intervene during the Osh pogroms in 2010 or during the current round of border skirmishes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, I would like to see a companion article describing the conditions under which Russia would be willing to use its forces to maintain stability in the region.