The impact of the Crimea annexation on Russian naval interests

As part of a broader modernization program for its Navy, Russia seeks to  develop a naval force that can dominate the Black Sea and  expand Russian presence in the Mediterranean. While not all the ramifications of Russia’s recent annexation of Crimea are yet fully apparent, one consequence is that the Russian Navy will now be able to modernize and expand the Black Sea Fleet with fewer constraints. Previously, any Russian aspirations for expanding its naval presence in the Black Sea were limited by the need to get agreement from Ukraine for any new ships stationed in Sevastopol.  Given Ukrainian resistance to the expansion of the Russian fleet at Sevastopol, Russia had long faced a situation where only one of the fleet’s combat ships could deploy outside the Black Sea on a regular basis. With the annexation of Crimea, this circumstance is rapidly changing.  After taking over Crimea, Russia quickly upgraded the region’s air defense and coastal defense systems and announced plans to station long-range bombers, fighter planes, and ASW aircraft at air bases in the region. The Russian Navy has plans to replace the Black Sea Fleet’s Soviet-era ships with modern frigates and diesel submarines. If these plans are carried out, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet will be on a path to once again become the dominant naval force in the region.

It is likely that this enhanced Russian Black Sea  fleet will be used to expand Russian influence in the Black Sea and also to reinforce Russia’s naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean. In March 2013, Vladimir Putin announced plans to establish a Mediterranean naval task force, with up to 10 combat ships permanently operating in the region. The core of this force, including the command element, is expected to come from the Black Sea Fleet once that fleet has been modernized.

Because of Crimea’s geographic position, full control of the port of Sevastopol will give the Russian Navy the opportunity to enhance its posture and presence in the Black Sea. Over the longer term, Moscow is likely to use its expanding presence in the Black Sea to project power and influence toward the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the broader Mediterranean littoral. The ensuing expansion of Moscow’s perception of its strength and influence may encourage Russia to pursue unilateral policies in the region, reducing incentives for cooperation through existing mechanisms such as BLACKSEAFOR and Black Sea Harmony.

An expanding Russian Black Sea is of direct concern to Turkey. As the Russian Black Sea Fleet capabilities and readiness declined over the last two decades, Turkey effectively became the dominant naval power in the Black Sea region. Turkish leaders have not reacted publicly to Russia’s naval ambitions in the region; however, according to one close observer of the Turkish Navy, if the Russian Navy does once again seek to become the most powerful naval force in the Black Sea, Turkey is likely to react.  According to that observer, Ankara may be prepared to “dust off and update” Cold War-era plans designed to prevent the Russian Navy from gaining control of the Turkish Straits during a conflict.

Russia’s plans to expand its Mediterranean squadron derive from its aspiration to restore its role as an important naval power in the region. Russia takes pride in the fact that it currently maintains more ships in the Mediterranean than the United States does. In recent years Russia’s naval forces have consciously and deliberately been used to complicate and/or challenge U.S. and NATO actions (such as in Syria), and they may seek to do so again in the future.

To operate more than a few ships forward on a permanent basis in the Mediterranean, Russia needs to have access to local ports for replenishment and repairs. With access to its only base at Tartus complicated by the civil war in Syria, Russia is looking to develop alternative relationships that could lead to port access and eventual basing rights. Egypt, Cyprus, Montenegro, and even Greece may be potential targets for closer naval ties.

While the Ukraine crisis does not yet make it clear whether Russia intends to take a more assertive role in countering U.S. and NATO interests in the Black Sea region, the U.S. should probably not expect a return to the period when NATO and Russian naval forces engaged in partnership activities in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, such as Active Endeavor and Black Sea Harmony. Future cooperation is likely to be limited and to occur only in narrow areas where U.S. and Russian interests happen to coincide.

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet

The crisis in Ukraine has highlighted the importance of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. I’ve written about the fleet in the past, but it may be worthwhile to provide an update, especially as there have been a couple of surveys of the fleet published in recent days in the Russian press and blogosphere.

The fleet currently consists of 40 combat ships, 28 of which are on active duty while the others are undergoing repair or modernization. The average age of these ships is 25, though the largest and most capable ships that are based in Sevastopol are also the oldest. (The average age of Sevastopol-based ships is 32.5) The flagship is the Slava-class cruiser Moskva. Large combat ships also include the Kara-class cruiser Kerch, the Kashin-class destroyer Smetlivyi, and two Krivak class frigates (Pytlivyi and Ladnyi). The Ladnyi is current being overhauled and is scheduled to return to active duty in August. A second Kara-class cruiser, the Ochakov, was decommissioned several years ago and has now been scuttled so as to block the exist of several Ukrainian Navy ships from Lake Donuzlav. These ships comprise the 11th brigade of ASW ships. The 197th brigade of amphibious ships includes six active ships: three Alligator class (Saratov, Orsk, Nikolai Filchenkov) and four Ropucha class (Novocherkassk, Azov, and Yamal), as well as one inactive Ropucha class ship, the Tsesar Kunikov. Together, these two brigades comprise the 30th division of surface ships. Smaller combat ships based in Sevastopol include three Grisha-class corvettes (Suzdalets, Aleksandrovsk, and Muromets) in the 400th ASW ship squadron, four mine warfare ships in the 418th minesweeper squadron, and 4-5 missile boats in the 295th missile boat squadron. There is also the Alrosa Kilo-class submarine. The newest of any of these ships were commissioned in 1990.

Ships based in Novorossiisk include three Grisha-class corvettes (Kasimov, Eisk, Povorino), two Nanuchka-class missile ships (Mirazh and Shtil), five active and two inactive mine warfare ships, and two hoverborne guided missile corvettes (Bora and Sivuch). These ships are generally newer than the Sevastopol-based ships, with an average age of 22.8. There are also several quite new patrol boats based in Novorossiisk.

Over the next few years, the BSF is expected to receive six new Admiral Grigorovich class frigates over the next three years. These are similar to the Talwar class frigates that Russia exported to India a few years ago. It is also expected to receive up to six new improved Kilo class diesel submarines in the same time period.

Finally, it may be worth briefly pointing out the Black Sea Fleet’s land and air forces, which include the 11th coastal missile artillery brigade armed with Bastion anti-ship missile systems. These are normally located in Anapa (2 on the map), though there have been some reports that they have been relocated to the Crimea in recent days. The 1096th anti-aircraft missile regiment is located in Sevastopol (5 on the map). Naval infantry forces include the 810th naval infantry brigade based in Sevastopol (3 on the map) and the 382nd independent naval infantry battalion based in Temriuk (4 on the map). The 431st naval reconnaissance post is located in Tuapse, near the border with Abkhazia (6 on the map). Naval aviation forces include facilities at Kacha (7 on the map) and Gvardeiskoe (8 on the map), both Crimea. The former houses (approximately) 20 Ka-27 and Mi-14 helicopters and 10 Mi-8 helicopters, as well as 10 Antonov transport planes of various types and 4 Be-12 amphibious planes. The latter houses 22 Su-24M attack aircraft.

Update: Thanks to Constantin Bogdanov, who highlighted some changes that I (and the authors of the surveys) missed: “The 1096th anti-aircraft missile regiment was disbanded in 2011; now there are two anti aircraft battalions (зенитно-ракетных дивизионов) combined with 810th brigade. Also, all Mi-14 are scrapped between 1995-2005.”

The role of the Black Sea Fleet in Russian naval strategy

The Russian military analyst Prokhor Tebin has put together a very useful article explaining Crimea’s military significance for Russia. He highlights the Black Sea’s economic significance for Russia: Russia’s Black Sea commercial ports carry 30 percent of its total maritime exports. The Black Sea also provides the closest access for Russia to the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, which is important for both economic and geopolitical reasons. Tebin points out that the Black Sea Fleet is needed to ensure that access, as well as to deal with potential  instability in the Caucasus.  It will also serve as a logistics hub for the Mediterranean task force that the Russian navy has decided to form, though ships for the task force will come from other fleets as well. He ranks the fleet third in importance for the Russian Navy, behind the Northern and Pacific Fleets, but ahead of the Baltic Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla.

The composition of the fleet is currently inadequate for its missions. It has only a few old Soviet-era ships: one missile cruiser, three frigates, seven large amphibious ships, and one diesel submarine. It has not received any new combat ships since 1990, while almost all of its existing ships will need to be decommissioned fairly soon. Tebin compares the strength of the BSF to the Turkish navy, which includes 16 frigates, 8 corvettes, and 14 diesel submarines, with more ships on the way. To change the situation, Russia is currently building six new Talwar-class frigates and six improved Kilo class diesel submarines for the BSF. The fleet may also get some small missile ships and gunboats, as well as new minesweepers. Tebin considers this an absolute minimum for the BSF and argues that it will still not be enough to fulfill all of the fleet’s missions or to restore the balance of power in the Black Sea. He also calls for the development of additional shore-based infrastructure, especially in Novorossiisk. However, the latter port is inferior in location and climate conditions to Sevastopol, being subject to the extremely strong wind known as Bora. This relatively unpredictable wind, with speeds registered at over 200km/hour, has in the past damaged ships at pier. The location of Novorossiisk is also far less central than Sevastopol and the harbor is inferior. For these reasons, Tebin argues that Novorossiisk can only serve a complementary role for the Black Sea Fleet, while Sevastopol must remain its main base for the foreseeable future.

In addition, Tebin also provides a very nice map of Russian military facilities in Crimea, which I reproduce below.

The legend reads as follows:

The 1997 agreement permits a maximum of 25,000 personnel, including no more than 1,987 naval infantry and naval aviation personnel. 14,000 are actually deployed.

1) Sevastopol: main Black Sea Fleet forces, up to 30 ships; 810 naval infantry brigade; 17th arms storage facility, Khersones and Yuzhnyi airfields

2) Kacha airfield: Be-12 and An-26 aircraft, Ka-27 and Mi-8 helicopters

3) Gvardeiskoe airfield: 20 Su-24 bombers

4) Feodosiia: 31st naval armaments testing center

5) Cape Opuk: naval firing range

6) Otradnoe: 219th radio-electronic warfare regiment

7) Yalta: 830th communications post

8) Priberezhnoe: 1001st high-frequency communications post

 

Summary of Russian navy ship construction

Ilya Kramnik has put together a handy set of summary tables of Russian naval surface ship construction, including contracts signed. The Russian original is here, for those interested.

Total for the Russian Navy as of 17.11.2013: 41 contracted combat ships, incl. 2 universal amphibious assault ships, 2 large amphibious assault ships, 14 frigates, 15 corvettes, 8 small missile boats. Of these, 24 ships are under construction, incl. 2 universal amphibious assault ships, 2 large amphibious assault ships, 9 frigates, 5 corvettes, 6 small missile boats. Six of these ships have been launched, incl. 1 universal amphibious assault ship, 1 large amphibious assault ship, 1 frigate,  1 corvette, and 2 small missile boats.

Universal Amphibious Ships

Project # BPC-160 (Mistral)

Name Shipyard Laid down Launched Sea trials Commissioning Notes
Vladivostok STX Europe,  Saint-Nazare; Baltiiskii Zavod, St. Petersburg 01.02.2012 15.10.2013 Spring 2014 (planned) Nov 2014 (planned) Planned for Pacific Fleet. Crew being formed.
Sevastopol STX Europe,  Saint-Nazare; Baltiiskii Zavod, St. Petersburg 18.06.2013 Oct 2014 (planned) 2015 (planned) 2015 (planned) Planned for Pacific Fleet

Total: 2 contracted, 2 under construction, incl. 1 launched

Large Amphibious ships

Project # 11711 (Ivan Gren)

Name Shipyard Laid down Launched Sea trials Commissioning Notes
Ivan Gren Yantar, Kaliningrad 23.12.2004 18.05.2012 2014 (planned) 2014 (planned)
Yantar, Kaliningrad Keel laid, construction frozen. Continuation of the series is uncertain.

Total: 2 contracted, 2 under construction, incl. 1 launched

Frigates

Project # 22350 (Admiral Gorshkov)

Name Shipyard Laid down Launched Sea trials Commissioning Notes
Admiral Gorshkov Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg 01.02.2006 29.10.2010 Spring 2014 (planned) Fall 2014 (planned) Commissioning delayed Commissioning delayed because AU A-192 artillery unit is not ready.  Planned for Northern Fleet.
Admiral Kasatonov Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg 26.11.2009 Spring 2014 (planned) Spring 2015 (planned) 2015 (planned) Planned for Northern Fleet
Admiral Golovko Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg 01.02.2012 2014 (planned) 2015 (planned) 2016 (planned) Planned for Northern Fleet
Admiral Isakov Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg 14.11.2013 2015 (planned) 2016 (planned) 2016 (planned) Planned for Northern Fleet
Admiral Yumashev Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg Spring 2014 (planned) 2016 (planned) 2017 (planned) 2017 (planned) Keel being laid
Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg 2014 (planned) 2017 (planned) Keel being laid
Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg 2015 (planned) 2018 (planned) Contract signed
Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg 2015 (planned) 2018 (planned) Contract signed

Project 11356 (Admiral Grigorovich)

Name

Shipyard Laid down Launched Sea trials Commissioning

Notes

Admiral Grigorovich Yantar, Kaliningrad 18.12.2010 Fall 2013 (planned) Spring 2014 (planned) 2014 (planned) Planned for Black Sea Fleet
Admiral Essen Yantar, Kaliningrad 08.07.2011 Spring 2014 (planned) Summer 2014 (planned) 2014 (planned) Planned for Black Sea Fleet
Admiral Makarov Yantar, Kaliningrad 29.02.2012 Winter 2015 (planned) Spring 2015 (planned) 2015 (planned) Planned for Black Sea Fleet
Admiral Butakov Yantar, Kaliningrad 12.07.2013 2015 (planned) 2015 (planned) 2016 (planned)
Admiral Istomin Yantar, Kaliningrad 15.11.2013 2015 (planned) 2016 (planned) 2016 (planned)
Admiral Kornilov Yantar, Kaliningrad Winter 2014 (planned) 2016 (planned) Keel being laid

Total: 14 contracted, 9 under construction, incl. 1 launched

 

Corvettes

Project 20380 (Steregushchii)

Name

Shipyard Laid down Launched Sea trials Commissioning

Notes

Sovershennyi Amur Shipyard, Komsomolsk-na-Amure 30.06.2006 Fall 2013 (planned) Spring 2014 (planned) 2014 (planned) Construction delayed due to shipyard’s poor financial situation.

Planned for Pacific Fleet

Stoikii Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg 10.11.2006 30.05.2012 Spring 2014 (planned) 2014 (planned) Construction delayed due to problems with artillery unit AU A-190. Planned for Baltic Fleet.
Gromkii Amur Shipyard, Komsomolsk-na-Amure 20.04.2012 2014 (planned) 2014 (planned) 2015 (planned) Planned for Pacific Fleet
Rezvyi Amur Shipyard, Komsomolsk-na-Amure 2014 (planned) 2017 (planned) Contract signed

Planned for Pacific Fleet

Strogii (likely) Amur Shipyard, Komsomolsk-na-Amure 2014 (planned) 2017 (planned) Contract signed, Planned for Pacific Fleet

Project 20385 (Gremiashchii)

Name

Shipyard Laid down Launched Sea trials Commissioning

Notes

Gremiashchii Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg 01.02.2012 2015 (planned) 2015 (planned) 2016 (planned)
Provornyi Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg 25.07.2013 2016 (planned) 2016 (planned) 2016 (planned)
Sposobnyi (likely) Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg 2013 (planned) 2016 (planned) 2017 (planned) Keel being laid
Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg 2014 (planned) 2017 (planned) Keel being laid
Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg 2014 (planned) 2017 (planned) Keel being laid
Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg 2018 (planned) Contract signed
Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg 2018 (planned) Contract signed
Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg 2018 (planned) Contract signed
Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg 2019 (planned) Contract signed
Severnaia Verf, St. Petersburg 2019 (planned) Contract signed
Total: 15 contracted, 5 under construction, incl. 1 launched. In 2008-2013 the navy received three project 20380 corvettes. The number of contracted corvettes may be reduced in favor of a new littoral combat ship-style corvette.

Small Missile Boats

(often considered corvettes by Western analysts)

Project 21631 (Buyan)

Name

Shipyard Laid down Launched Sea trials Commissioning

Notes

Grad Sviazhsk Zelenodolsk shipyard 27.08.2010 09.03.2013 08.2013 2013 (planned) Planned for Caspian Flotilla
Uglich Zelenodolsk shipyard 22.07.2011 10.04.2013 08.2013 2013 (planned) Planned for Caspian Flotilla
Velikii Ustiug Zelenodolsk shipyard 27.08.2011 2013 (planned) 2014 (planned) 2014 (planned) Planned for Caspian Flotilla
Zelenyi Dol Zelenodolsk shipyard 29.08.2012 2014 (planned) 2014 (planned) Planned for Caspian Flotilla
Serpukhov Zelenodolsk shipyard 25.01.2013 2014 (planned) 2015 (planned) Likely for Black Sea Fleet
Vyshnii Volochek Zelenodolsk shipyard 25.08.2013 2015 (planned) 2015 (planned) Likely for Black Sea Fleet
Orekhovo-Zuyevo Zelenodolsk shipyard 2014 (planned) 2016 (planned) Contract signed. Likely for Black Sea Fleet
Zelenodolsk shipyard 2014 (planned) 2016 (planned) Contract signed. Likely for Black Sea Fleet
Total: 8 contracted, 6 under construction, incl. 2 launched.

MVMS-2013 naval salon prompts more reflections on the future of the Russian navy

There have been a number of interesting articles written on the future of the Russian Navy in conjunction with the naval salon in St. Petersburg earlier this month. I’ll try to summarize the interesting points without repeating material found in my earlier articles on this topic.

The most recent bit of news is that the Russian navy is planning to order an additional three Talwar class (project 11356) frigates, on top of the six already in the works. The idea is that these are relatively capable ships that can be built and outfitted very quickly (at a rate of one per year for the construction). Three are currently under construction and according to the most recent reports, two more are to be laid down this year. These are well armed ships, comparable to the Sovremennyi class destroyers in armament, though more versatile. Whereas the original plan had been to deploy all six to the Black Sea Fleet, the current plan is to station the first three there while the next three would go to the Baltic Fleet. As Prokhor Tebin points out, this makes absolutely no sense. The Baltic Fleet should be the Russian Navy’s lowest priority, focused primarily on testing new ships and training. Both the BSF and the Pacific Fleet are in much greater need of new ships of this type. But that sort of thing can be changed once the ships are actually ready for commissioning. The truly significant news is that three more such ships will be built in the near future and, unlike the more complicated Admiral Gorshkov class frigates, are likely to be put to use quite quickly.

Ilya Kramnik had an interesting summary of plans for the future that adds some information and analysis to what I’ve already discussed.  He mentions plans for a new attack submarine that is expected to become the mainstay of the fleet for the next several decades. This will be a smaller and cheaper submarine than the Yasen class. It will combine the usual missions of protecting Russian and tracking foreign SSBNs. In other words, if we thinking of the Yasen as the Russian Seawolf, then this new class will be the Virginia. Plans call for 20 such submarines to be built by the end of the 2020s, with construction of the first sub to start in the next 5-7 years.

So if all the submarine plans are carried out, by 2030 the Russian Navy will get a total of 35-36 new nuclear submarines, including 8 Boreis, 7-8 Yasens, and up to 20 of the new class. The total cost would be 1.5 trillion rubles at current prices, not including expenses for modernizing existing submarines. Personally, I think this is overly ambitious. Even if we assume that the design process will proceed without delays and construction and construction does start in 2018 or thereabouts, I highly doubt that the Russian shipbuilding industry is capable of building 20 new submarines in 10-12 years. I realize that the submarine-building sector is the healthiest part of the industry, but there is just no record even in the industry’s Soviet history of building two nuclear submarines of the same type per year. Even one would be ambitious, given recent history.  I suppose it would be possible if the Amur shipyard was pressed into service, though my understanding is that it is not building submarines any more. Even if it were, it would take a lot to get that shipyard up to speed.

In addition to the new destroyer that we discussed last week, new plans for surface ships include a littoral combat ship. The design of the LCS has not been finalized and fairly non-traditional options such as a catamaran or trimaran are supposedly on the table.  Industry representatives want to build 1-2 ships of the two best designs to test their capabilities and then select one for serial production. 35-40 such ships could be built for all four fleets, at a total cost of 250-280 billion rubles. Such pace of construction would be made possible by using multiple shipyards, including those in St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad, Komsomolsk-na-Amure, Zelenodolsk and possible Krasnoe Sormovo.

Discussions are still under way about the design of a potential new aircraft carrier.  Photos of a model that represents current thinking show a classical design, equipped with a ski jump and a catapult, and with an estimated length of 320 meters and 80,000 tons displacement. While discussions continue, the Admiral Kuznetsov will remain in service. Its modernization, originally scheduled to begin in 2012 will be postponed until the second half of this decade.

The main problem with all these plans is the continued weakness of the shipbuilding sector. In a separate article, Kramnik mentions the complexity of new equipment, including radars, control systems, hydroacoustics, and weapons.  He notes that this has led to delays in construction of the Admiral Gorshkov class frigates and the Yasen class submarines, among others. (I would also add the Lada class diesel submarines to this list.) There are also complications resulting from the merger of many disparate plants, in varying condition and with different ways of doing business, into the United Shipbuilding Corporation. This has resulted in various problems with finances and personnel that presently can only be resolved through “manual control.”

Igor Zakharov, the vice president of United Shipbuilding Corporation, argues that the way to solve the sector’s problems is to give the chief designer of any major shipbuilding project both personal responsibility before the client and the right to ensure that sub-contractors fulfill their obligations on time. He doesn’t spell out what mechanisms would be used to ensure the latter, but he does call for the introduction of arbitration mechanisms to resolve conflicts between industry and the MOD over issues such as pricing.

He also notes that Russian shipbuilding needs to adapt to the modern world, where hulls can last 50 years or more while electronics and armaments become outdated much more quickly. This requires ships to be built in a way that allows for easy modernization and replacement of weapons and equipment. Soviet ships, by contrast, did not consider the possibility of such updates, making their modernization in the new environment very costly and time consuming. New capital ships will be built in small series. Furthermore, rapid advances in electronics will require that even these series be divided into sub-series that will maintain unity of ship design while updating electronics and weaponry. Some systems and weapons can be used across ship classes. We are already seeing elements of these ideas in systems such as the multipurpose shipboard firing system (УКСК) and in the modular construction of the latest classes of Russian corvettes and frigates.

These are good ideas. The problem is the extent to which they are stymied by the conglomerate nature of United Shipbuilding and by the difficulty its personnel and business structures face in adapting to the new way of doing business. Over time, I imagine the shipbuilding industry will improve. But time is needed, while the navy is providing the industry with somewhat unrealistic timetables for the construction of new ships. The result will be more delays, though probably not as bad as in the recent past.

Alternative designs for the new Russian destroyer

Just a quick note today. My friend and colleague Ilya Kramnik plots out four alternative designs for the new Russian destroyer currently in the works.

1) 7500-9000 tons, ~160 meters long, gas turbine CODAG propulsion, top speed of >30 knots

Equipped with 1x1x130mm gun, 2 CIWS complexes, 32 universal shipboard firing complexes (Kalibr/Oniks) and 64 Redut shipboard missiles, 2 Paket-NK anti-submarine torpedo systems, 2 helicopters

2) 9500-11500 tons, ~190 meters long, gas turbine CODAG propulsion, top speed of approximately 30 knots

Equipped with 1x2x130mm guns, 4 CIWS complexes, 48 universal shipboard firing complexes (Kalibr/Oniks) and 80 Redut shipboard missiles, 2 Paket-NK anti-submarine torpedo systems, 2 helicopters

3) 12,500-14,700 tons, ~200 meters long, either gas turbine CODAG or nuclear propulsion, top speed of approximately 30 knots

Equipped with 2x2x152mm guns, 4 CIWS complexes, 64 universal shipboard firing complexes (Kalibr/Oniks) and 80 Redut shipboard missiles, 2 Paket-NK anti-submarine torpedo systems, 2 helicopters

4) 13,000-15,200 tons, ~210 meters long, either gas turbine CODAG or nuclear propulsion, top speed of approximately 30 knots

Equipped with 1x2x152mm guns, 4 CIWS complexes, 16 universal shipboard firing complexes (Kalibr/Oniks) and 48 Redut shipboard missiles, 2 Paket-NK anti-submarine torpedo systems, 5 helicopters

All four versions would have the Sigma-E combat management system and Poliment active phased array radar. The largest of these options is pretty close to a cruiser, I suppose.

Russian military shipbuilding: an update (part 2)

(Based on a report in Moscow Defense Brief. For a discussion of submarines and surface combat ships, see part 1)

Auxiliary ships

The Russian Navy is getting a number of new support ships in the near future. These include three Project 23120 9000 ton ocean-going logistics ships, the first of which was laid down at Severnaya Verf in November 2012. The ships are similar to civilian offshore hydrocarbon exploration ships and are to be delivered at a rate of one a year in 2014-16. The navy is also expecting to receive six Project 20180 support and weapons transport ships. Two of the ships are currently under construction, with delivery expected in 2014 and 2016. The ships, being built at the Zvezdochka shipyard, are modified versions of the Zvezdochka salvage tug commissioned in 2010. The Igor Belousov (project 21300S) large submarine rescue ship, which was laid down in December 2005 in response to the Kursk disaster, was finally launched in October 2012 after a long delay caused by the failure of a Russian design bureau to provide a deepwater diving complex for the ship. In the end, the navy has settled on a British design that is being built in Russia. The ship is due to be commissioned in 2014, with another three ships of this type likely to be ordered in the near future. In addition, the navy has ordered a large number of harbor support ships and tugboats, with around 80 expected to enter service by 2016.

Exports

Russian shipyards continue to have a thriving export business. The biggest customers in 2012 were India, Vietnam and Algeria. Vietnam has ordered six Improved Kilo class (project 06361) submarines from the Admiralty Shipyards. The first two submarines of this order were launched in 2012, while subs three and four were laid down last year. The first sub is expected to be delivered this year. The Vietnamese navy took delivery of two Svetlyak class (project 10412) patrol boats in October 2012. It also ordered two modified Gepard class (project 11661E) frigates, to be delivered in 2016 and 2017. These are in addition to two similar frigates delivered in 2011. Both ships are to be built in Zelenodolsk. Vietnam is also building, under license, a series of ten Tarantul V class (project 12418) corvettes, with the first two ships expected to be commissioned this year.

Contracts with the Algerian navy are for modernization of existing ships, rather than the construction of new ones. These include the mid-life overhaul of a Kilo class (project 877EKM) submarine at the Admiralty Shipyards, which was completed in July 2012, and the ongoing modernization of a Koni class (project 1159TM) frigate and Nanuchka II class (project 1234EM) corvette at Severnaya Verf. Further surface ship modernization orders are expected once the current pair are finished.

India remains the most important foreign military customer for Russian shipyards. In 2012, the Indian navy inducted the INS Chakra, an improved Akula class nuclear-powered attack submarine that was leased to India for a ten-year period. There is some speculation that a second submarine of the same type may be leased to India in the future. Yantar shipyard completed a second series of Talwar class (project 11356) frigates for the the Indian navy, with two ships delivered in 2012 and a third in June 2013. Negotiations are currently under way for another set of three frigates to be built. In January 2013, the Zvezdochka shipyard completed the mid-life overhaul of a Kilo class (project 877EKM) submarine for the Indian navy. This was the fifth Indian diesel submarine to be modernized at this plant. Finally, the long-term effort to modernize the former Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier for the Indian navy, which was due to be handed over in 2012, hit another snag because of problems with the main power plant, causing at least a one year delay in the project.

Analysis

Based on Boltenkov’s summary and my own past research, it seems to me that the Russian shipbuilding industry has improved in recent years but remains in relatively poor shape overall. Yantar Shipyard in particular has been reported to be in fairly poor shape due to a lack of investment. On the other hand, the Severnaya Verf, Sevmash, and Zvezdochka shipyards are in relatively good condition. Russian shipyards are good at building ships that they have been building for some time, such as the Talwar (modified Krivak) class frigates and improved Kilo class submarines. The implementation of new designs, on the other hand, has led to numerous problems and delays regardless of the type of ship and the shipyard building it. The construction of Admiral Gorshkov class frigates, Lada class submarines, and Admiral Gren amphibious ships have all been affected by construction delays and other problems. Construction of nuclear-powered submarines is proceeding, but at a much slower pace than hoped for by the Ministry of Defense. Frequent changes in requirements have resulted in a number of ship classes that have been cancelled after only one or two ships, which will have a negative impact on maintenance. Finally, the goal of renewing the Russian navy’s fleet of larger surface combat ships still seems a long way off, with a design for a new class of destroyers still several years away from completion.